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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It is now nearly 7 years since the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA)1 was 
brought onto the statute books.2 It is now 5 years since the major 
provisions of the Act became effective.3 For those unfamiliar with the 
Act, it is a blockbuster piece of legislation4 which in its entirety runs to 
214 sections (covering 120 pages) and 24 Schedules which make up the 
remainder of the total 389 pages. The LSA 2007 sought to fundamentally 
recalibrate the regulation of the legal services market. To achieve this, the 
Act introduced a new tier of oversight regulation, above the then existing 
regulators of legal services.5 This new oversight regulator, called the 
Legal Services Board (LSB) is armed with an arsenal of statutory powers. 
The LSA 2007 also established a new ombudsman in the form of the 
Office of Legal Complaints.6 Potentially the most contentious change 
brought about by the LSA 2007 was that it paved the way for new 
methods of practising law,7 including, Alternative Business Structures 
* Dr Tim Sinnamon, BA(Hons), PgDip, LLM PgCAP, PhD, FHEA, Lecturer in 
Law, Buckingham Law School, University of Buckingham, Buckingham, MK18 
1EG. Email: tim.sinnamon@buckingham.ac.uk. 
1 Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA 2007). 
2 Ibid. Received Royal Assent on the 30 October 2007.  
3 The Legal Services Board came into being on the 1 January 2009. It became 
fully operational on the 1 January 2010.  
4 James Thorne and Ian Miller, Guide to the Legal Services Act (Lexis Nexis 
2009). 
5 Now termed ‘Approved Regulators’: The Law Society, The General Council of 
the Bar, The Master of Faculties, The Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, 
The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, The Institute of Trade Mark 
Attorneys, The Association of Law Costs Draftsmen; The Council for Licensed 
Conveyancers. 
6 LSA 2007, pt 6.  
7 Ibid pt 5. It should be noted that Legal Disciplinary Partnership and Multi-
disciplinary Partnership were previously provided for, in a limited way, in the 
Administration of Justice Act 1986 and the Courts and Legal Services Act 1992, 
though no steps were substantively taken to develop them.  
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(ABS) which, when fully developed will allow for what were commonly 
referred to as multi-disciplinary practices, and much more. Currently the 
authorised regulators of ABS8 permit non-lawyers to own legal service 
providers and many more permutations of ownership and service delivery 
than hitherto existed. At the time of writing 2909 ABS have been 
authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority since 26 
March 2012. 43 ABS10 have been authorised and are regulated by the 
Council for Licensed Conveyancers since 6 October 2011. IPReg11 who 
regulates for and on behalf of CIPA12 and ITMA13 were approved by the 
Ministry of Justice14 and the LSB to regulate ABS in December 2013. The 
Bar announced on 27 June 2014 that it will move towards entity licencing, 
though they have signalled that this will fall short of full ABS.15 The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) was 
recommended to the Lord Chancellor by the LSB in December 2013 to be 
accepted as an approved regulator for Probate and as a licensing authority 
for ABS. The Lord Chancellor approved of this on the 6 March 2014 
paving the way for ICAEW to become the first non-legal body to be able 
to regulate probate services and licence ABS.16 ICAEW received assent to 
regulate probate activities and licence ABS on the 14 August 2014.17 
8 Ibid pt 5. 
9 ‘Register of Licensed Bodies (ABS)’ (Solicitors Regulation Authority) 
<http://www.sra.org.uk/absregister/> accessed 29 July 2014. 
10 ‘Licensed Body (ABS) Register’ (Council for Licensed Conveyancers) 
<http://www.conveyancer.org.uk/absregister.php> accessed 29 July 2014.  
11 Intellectual Property Regulation Board.  
12 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys.  
13 Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys. 
14 Neil Rose, ‘IPReg Poised to Become Licensing Authority Number 3’ (Legal 
Futures, 10 December 2013) <http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/ipreg-
poised-become-abs-licensing-authority-number-3> accessed 24 July 2014. 
15 Catherine Baksi, ‘Bar Regulator Announces Move into Entity Licensing’ (Law 
Society Gazette, 27 June 2014) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/ipreg-
authorised-to-regulate-abs-entities/law/bar-regulator-announces-move-into-entity-
licensing/5041910.article> accessed 14 August 2014; Nick Hilborne, ‘Barristers 
Lay Out Plans for Range of New Entities’ (Legal Futures, 1 July 2014) 
<http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/barristers-lay-out-plans-range-new-
entities> accessed 14 August 2014.  
16 Neil Rose, ‘Grayling Gives Accountants ABS and Probate Green Light’ (Legal 
Futures, 7 March 2014) <http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/grayling-
gives-accountants-abs-probate-green-light> accessed 15 August 2014.  
17 Gazette Reporter, ‘ICAEW Approved to Regulate Probate and License ABS’ 
(Law Society Gazette, 14 August 2014) 
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These developments signal profound change and it is for this reason 
that this paper examines, in part, the way in which regulation of the legal 
services market is done. In particular it considers the regulatory objectives 
included in the LSA 2007.18 The regulatory objectives run through the 
LSA 2007 like the lettering in a stick of rock. There are over thirty 
substantive references to the regulatory objectives in the Act. Far from 
being a passive declaration of the purpose of the Act, the regulatory 
objectives underpin the statutory obligations of the LSB19 and the 
approved regulators.20 The LSB, the approved regulators, and the OLC21 
are all obliged to act in a way that they consider appropriate for meeting 
the regulatory objectives.22 The LSB23 and the OLC24 need to prove how 
they have met the regulatory objectives in their annual reports. The LSB 
has a considerable range of powers, including: setting approved regulators 
performance targets,25 directions regarding actions that need to be taken,26 
censuring approved regulators,27 giving intervention directions allowing 
for the removal of a regulatory function from an approved regulator,28 
and, most dramatically, removing an approved regulators licence to 
regulate.29 Each of the foregoing powers rests on the LSB’s determination 
as to how the approved regulators’ actions or omissions have affected one 
or more of the regulatory objectives. 
 <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/icaew-approved-to-regulate-probate-and-
license-abss/5042605.article> accessed 15 August 2014. 
18 LSA 2007, pt 1, s 1.  
19 Ibid s 3(2)(a). 
20 Ibid s 28(2)(b). 
21 Ibid s 118(2)(b). 
22 The Regulatory Objectives are: (a) protecting and promoting the public 
interest; (b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law; (c) 
improving access to justice; (d) protecting and promoting the interests of 
consumers; (e) promoting competition in the provision of services within 
subsection (2); (f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal 
profession; (g) increase public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and 
duties; (h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional principles.  
23 LSA 2007, s 6(2)(b). 
24 Ibid s 118(2)(b). 
25 Ibid s 31(2)(a). 
26 Ibid s 32(4).  
27 Ibid s 35. 
28 Ibid s 41(1). 
29 Ibid s 45. 
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The importance attached to understanding what each regulatory 
objective means is undeniable. Regulators and administrative authorities 
are often charged with making complex judgements. In the context of the 
LSA 2007, individual objectives, within a broad spectrum of regulatory 
objectives, need to be rationalised, by the regulators, with each other. 
These regulatory objectives, for reasons outlined throughout this paper, 
and others,30 set the course for the regulation of legal services.  
The introduction of regulatory objectives into the LSA 2007 was by 
no means an uncontroversial move. There has been much discussion about 
these regulatory objectives and it is not the intention of this paper to 
revisit this.31 This paper considers two of the regulatory objectives, 
namely: the objectives of “protecting and promoting the consumer 
interest” and “protecting and promoting the public interest”. As this paper 
will both argue, and demonstrate, attention appears to have been lavished 
on the former at the expense of the latter. This paper argues that rather 
than the LSB investing time and effort into understanding the public 
interest, the consumer interest has become the focus of most, if not all 
regulatory endeavours. The consumer interest has become firmly 
embedded in the lexicon of the LSB to the exclusion of any meaningful 
consideration of the public interest. This paper examines the approach of 
the LSB to the consumer interest and argues that there is evidence to 
suggest that the design of the regulatory structure and the process of 
regulatory decision making is such that regulation is being potentially 
captured by the consumer interest and those preoccupied with consumer 
affairs and consumerism. It demonstrates how this attention is stimulated 
by both the design of the LSA 2007 and, maybe, capture of the oversight 
regulator & legal services regulation, not by the legal profession, as pre 
the Act it was commonly argued, but by the LSCP, the consumer lobby 
and the consumer interest. Moreover, this paper suggests that the LSB, 
and to a degree, the regulatory arms of the “Approved Regulators” have 
become “culturally captured.” This reinforces, as argued elsewhere by this 
author,32 the point that there should be a more considered, evidence based 
approach towards the public interest at the forefront of every regulatory 
endeavour, before any consideration of the consumer interest. This paper 
discusses in the next section what is required to found a claim of 
regulatory capture. The second section analyses what the consumer 
30 Laurel S Terry, Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon, ‘Adopting Regulatory 
Objectives for the Legal Profession’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2684. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Tim Sinnamon, ‘The Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Surrey 2013).  
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interest is, and establishes why pursuing it is not necessarily in the public 
interest. The third section identifies a number of structural features of the 
LSA 2007 which may, as a result of statutory creation, tilt regulation 
towards the consumer interest. These factors are important to any overall 
determination that capture of the legal services regulators has occurred. 
The fourth section reviews a number of decisions taken by the LSB. The 
final section draws together the points identified in the preceding sections 
and draws conclusions.  
 
2. REGULATORY CAPTURE AND THE CONSUMER 
INTEREST 
 
One of the intellectual arguments underpinning the developments that 
led to the LSA 2007 was that the legal profession had captured regulation 
for its own self-interest.33 Self-regulation by the professions was 
lambasted from a number of quarters.34 A number of commentators 
suggested that the regulatory environment at the time could be explained 
by private interest theories of regulation or capture.35 Many of these 
claims remain vulnerable to strict scrutiny especially as Stigler’s36 rather 
arbitrary standard of causal inference, in connection with his private 
interest theories of regulation have been uncritically embraced by a 
subsequent generation of economists.37 This paper does not seek to unpack 
these claims – rather, it argues, that if anything there has been, if ever 
33 Richard Abel, English Lawyers Between the Market and State The Politics of 
Professionalism (OUP 2004); David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory 
Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales, Final Report (December 
2004) 57-8; Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Kate Malleson, ‘Regulating Legal 
Services: Time for the Big Bang?’ (2004) 67 MLR 787; OECD, Competition in 
Professional Services (DAFFE/CLP 2000) 3-4; Iain Paterson and others, 
‘Regulation of Professional Services’ (IHS, 2003) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional_services/studies/prof_servi
ces_ihs_part_1.pdf> accessed 22 July 2014. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Frank Stephen, ‘The Market Failure Justification for the Regulation of 
Professional Services Markets and the Characteristics of Consumers’ in Claus 
Dieter Ehlerman and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 
2004: The Relationship Between Competition Law and (Liberal) Professions 
(Hart Publishing 2004); Paterson (n 33). 
36 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3.  
37 Daniel Carpenter and David A Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture, Special 
Interest Influence and How to Limit it (Cambridge 2014) 8-9. 
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there was capture by the professions, a pendulum swing, not necessarily to 
a neutral ground where regulation pursues policies free of capture, but, 
that matters have now swung beyond this, to a situation whereby 
regulation has become preoccupied with the consumer interest, as 
constructed and interpreted by the LSB, LSCP and lobbyists on behalf of 
discrete sections of the consumers of legal services.38  
The argument that the LSB and regulators are now preoccupied by the 
consumer interest is not a particularly new one. A number of claims have 
been made to this end.39 Notably, Lord Neuberger has referred to 
“consumer fundamentalism” and the “tyranny of the consumer interest.”40 
As recently as the 20 June 2014 he spoke of the dangers of the LSB 
regulating solely in favour of the consumer.41 This paper attempts to argue 
that rather than these being unjustifiable claims, as the previous Chairman 
of the LSB42 and current Chairwoman of the LSCP43 have tried to make 
38 The construction of the consumer interest by the LSB and LSCP has been by 
no means uniform or all embracing. It has concentrated on consumers of ‘regular 
legal services’ – (conveyancing, probate, small business matters etc) and 
vulnerable consumers (with specific impairments). It has not looked at the 
consumer in a wider sense – including the Government, the Courts, large 
businesses, society, the rule of law.  
39 Jonathan Goldsmith, ‘The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Lawyers 
Today and Tomorrow’ (2008) 28 North-Western Journal of International Law and 
Business 441; Ruth Deech, ‘Regulating the Regulators’ (Gresham College, 23 
May 2012) <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/regulating-the-
regulators> accessed 27 July 2014. 
40 David Neuberger, ‘The Tyranny of the Consumer or the Rule of Law’ (Speech 
by Lord Neuberger Master of the Rolls 25th Annual Bar Conference 6 November 
2010); Neuberger D, ‘Professional Discipline – Challenges for the Future’ (Lord 
Neuberger, Master of the Rolls, Keynote Speech, Disciplinary Conference, 5 
February 2010). 
41 ‘Lord Neuberger at a Conference of the Bar Councils of Northern Ireland and 
Ireland, Belfast: The Future of the Bar’ (The Supreme Court, 20 June 2014) 
<http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140620.pdf> accessed 14 August 
2014; Dan Bindman, ‘Neuberger Backs Single Regulator but Criticises LSB for 
Adding Cost and Confusion’ (Legal Futures, 25 June 2014) 
<http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/neuberger-backs-single-regulator-
criticises-lsb-adding-cost-confusion> accessed 14 August 2014. 
42 David Edmonds, ‘Quality and Standards in a Liberalised Market’ (Legal 
Services Board, 10 May 2012) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/speeches_presentation
s/2012/20120510-david-edmonds-russell_cooke_speech.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2014; Elizabeth Davies, ‘Unreflective Consumer Fundamentalism: Who are the 
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out – preoccupation with the consumer interest, to a point of regulatory 
capture, is an emerging reality. In addressing this claim it is important to 
set out firstly, the ingredients for a claim of consumer capture and 
secondly, the problems associated with the consumer interest which 
indicate that regulating primarily in this interest is neither pragmatic, 
appropriate, nor, necessarily in the public’s interest.  
 
Regulatory Capture  
 
There were a number of early models and case studies developing the 
theory of regulatory capture and the general understanding of the 
attendant dangers.44 Beyond these early works there has been relatively 
little follow up in recent decades.45 In a traditional sense, critics maintain 
that regulatory capture stunts competition and innovation, as firms are 
able to capture their regulators effectively wielding the regulatory power 
of the state and can use it as a weapon to block the entry or success of 
other firms.46 Capture has thus been alleged – perhaps quite plausibly – to 
figure significantly in the major human and environmental crises of our 
Unreflective Consumer Fundamentalists? (Legal Services Consumer Panel, 28 
February 2013)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/how_can_we_help/blog/blog_en
try_chair_march_2013.html> accessed 14 August 2014.  
43 Elizabeth Davies, ‘What is the Consumer Interest?: Using the Consumer 
Principles (Legal Services Consumer Panel, 20 November 2013) 
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/how_can_we_help/blog/blog_en
try_chair_006_2013.html> accessed 14 August 2014.  
44 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3. For a general account see: Robert 
Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation (Oxford 1999); Richard 
Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 335; Kip Viscusi, John Vernon and Joseph 
Harrington, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (2nd edn, MIT 1995); Peter 
Aranson, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion’ (1990) 
6 Journal of Law and Politics 247; Micheal Hankte-Domas, ‘The Public Interest 
Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?’ (2003) 15 European 
Journal of Law and Economics 165, 185; Hans Maks and Niels Phillipsen, ‘An 
Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Professions’ in Lode Vereeck Regulation 
of Architects (Intersentia, 2002); Cass R Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: 
Reconceiving the Regulatory State (University of Chicago Press 1990). 
45 Carpenter (n 37) 13. 
46 Ibid 1. 
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time.47 Capture has also been blamed for severely under-cutting efforts at 
reform.48 Plugging some of the gaps in the scholarship is now an edited 
collection by Carpenter and Moss published in 2014.49 The text, which 
will surely become seminal, brings together a set of authors from a range 
of disciplines who attempt to gain a clearer grasp of what regulatory 
capture is, where and to what extent it occurs, what prevents it from 
occurring more fully and pervasively, and, finally, it attempts to distil 
lessons for policy makers and the public for how capture can be mitigated 
and the public interest protected.50 For present purposes, the text suggests 
a useful working definition of regulatory capture and the key ingredients 
against which a claim of capture should be judged.  
  
“Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, in 
law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away 
from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated 
industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.” 51  
 
Previous definitions and theoretical treatments of capture theory have 
focused on the regulated industry capturing the regulator for its own 
benefits. In the context of legal services this would be the legal profession 
capturing regulation for its own self-interest. These theories afford little 
room for the consideration of other interests capturing regulation. In a 
departure from existing theories, Carpenter52 notes that in principle, the 
word “industry” in their definition could be replaced with the word 
“interest” or “special interest.” They advance this idea on the basis that 
they believe other actors have the potential to twist regulation to serve 
their own interests at the expense of the broader public interest.53 It is on 
the basis of this theoretical acknowledgement that this paper proceeds to 
argue that consumerism and the “consumer interest” in the hands of the 
LSB, LSCP and consumer lobby may be orientating regulation away from 
the public interest as a result of capture.  
The foregoing definition of capture can be broken down into three 
distinct elements. Firstly, public interest; secondly, intent and thirdly, 
regulated industry. Carpenter and others also set out quite clearly the 
47 Ibid 2. 
48 Ibid 2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 2.  
51 Ibid 13. 
52 Ibid 14. 
53 Ibid 14. 
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evidential burden required to establish a claim of capture. The Public 
Interest element is perhaps the most difficult element to qualify or 
quantify. Carpenter notes, as do a whole plethora of lawyers, political 
scientists and philosophers that both understanding and measuring the 
public interest is a “thorny problem as old as democracy”.54 The author of 
this paper has also conducted significant research on this very problem in 
the context of legal services,55 noting that the LSB’s own understanding 
of the public interest is problematical and lacking in many regards.56  
The second element of Carpenter’s definition requires intent. 
Carpenter argues that the fact that an industry or special interest is well 
served by regulation is deeply insufficient for a judgment of capture. Both 
intent and action on the part of the regulated industry or special interest 
are required. Unless the industry or special interest actively and 
knowingly pushes regulation away from the public interest, there can be 
no capture. Carpenter suggests the fact that an industry or special interest 
benefits from regulation, is, by itself, insufficient, because it could be 
alternatively explained by bureaucratic drift, coincidence, or mistakes, or 
a simple by product of public serving regulation.57  
The third element of Carpenter’s definition is consistent with many 
earlier theories of capture in which industry captures regulation for its 
own benefit. The industry or special interest needs therefore to derive 
some benefit from the regulation. Carpenter suggests that their definition 
of capture provides a set of standards for making statements about 
whether capture has occurred in the case of a given regulation or agency. 
He argues that three general empirical standards straightforwardly flow 
from their definition. To claim capture, they suggest an argument ought to 
provide a defeasible model of the public interest; show a policy shift away 
from the public interest and towards industry (special interest), and, show 
action and intent by the industry (special interest) in pursuit of this policy 
shift sufficiently effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable part of 
the shift.58 
The extent of Carpenter and other’s contribution to the literature is 
robust and there is much fruitful research to be conducted on a host of 
aspects of capture. Of particular note are the various ways in which, 
relatively subtly, scholars now suggest capture might come about. This is 
54 Ibid 13. 
55 Tim Sinnamon, ‘The Public Interest and the Legal Services Act 2007’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Surrey 2013).  
56 Ibid 172.  
57 Carpenter (n 37) 16-18. 
58 Ibid. 
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beyond the commonly understood methods of capture whereby political 
campaigns are funded by industry to exert influence, or, pressure is 
brought to bear on politicians, or the much discussed ‘revolving door’ 
method.59 In the context of legal services these more subtle forms of 
understanding how capture might occur are useful, as adducing evidence 
to substantiate a claim of capture in the traditional sense might prove 
difficult. Moving beyond the aforementioned crude incentives which 
might appeal to regulator’s personal self-interest, James Kwak,60 Nolan 
McCarty61 and Luigi Zingales62 each explore new mechanisms of 
understanding capture.  
James Kwak investigates the idea of cultural capture. He has explored 
new ways by which regulators are influenced, even unknowingly, by 
interests through a combination of social, cultural and intellectual 
currents.63 Moving beyond other forms of capture – Kwak argues that 
“People’s actions are the product of many different factors, and mixes of 
motivations are certainly possible.”64 He argues that there is evidence to 
suggest that regulators act according to their ideological beliefs.65 This, he 
suggests, only raises the question of how those beliefs are formed and 
specifically how the administrative process exposes regulators in such a 
way that it can colour their beliefs. Both the capture model and the public 
interest model of regulatory action assume that regulators are rational 
actors: either they maximise their material self-interest or they maximise 
their consciously held policy interests.66 However, there is another 
possibility: that regulators are susceptible to non- rational forms of 
influence, which interest groups can exploit to achieve the practical 
equivalent of capture-favourable policy outcomes. Kwak describes three 
mechanisms by which a regulated industry, or special interest, is able to 
59 Ibid 18. 
60 James Kwak, ‘Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis’ in Daniel Carpenter 
and David A Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture, Special Interest 
Influence and How to Limit it (n 63). 
61 Nolan McCarty, ‘Complexity, Capacity, and Capture’ in Daniel Carpenter and 
David A Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture, Special Interest Influence 
and How to Limit it (Cambridge 2014).  
62 Luigi Zingales, ‘Preventing Economists’ Capture’ in Daniel Carpenter and 
David A Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture, Special Interest Influence 
and How to Limit it (Cambridge 2014). 
63 Kwak (n 60). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 71. 
107 
                                                     
CONSUMER CAPTURE AND THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007 
 
 
shape regulators’ beliefs and actions – mechanisms that should not work if 
regulators are rational beings not devoted to their self-interest or if they 
form their policy preferences rationally. They are:  
 
Identity: Regulators are more likely to adopt positions advanced 
by people whom they perceive as being in their in-group.  
Status: Regulators are more likely to adopt positions advanced by 
people whom they perceive to be of a higher status in social, 
economic, intellectual, or other terms.  
Relationships: Regulators are more likely to adopt positions 
advanced by people who are in their social networks.67 
 
The composition, background, experience, political affiliation of the 
many new actors involved in legal services regulation merits scrutiny and 
could form the basis of a study in and of itself. For present purposes, it is 
noteworthy that there is a flow of staff members between regulatory 
organisations in the city and in particular senior members from the former 
regulator Oftel to the LSB. There is also a flow to and from the LSB, 
Ofcom, the FCA, the Competition Authorities and others QUANGOS.68 
From this it is plausible to suggest that there is an inter-exchange of ideas 
and methods of regulating – creating something of an “in group” and a 
broad based professional / social network. Existing studies have already 
identified this point in other sectors.69 It has also been identified that some 
67 Ibid 71. 
68 As an example of this - David Edmonds (former Chair of the LSB), Chris 
Kenny Chief Executive of the LSB both previously worked at Oftel and David 
Edmonds remained for a while with Ofcom. Alex Roy, Research Director of the 
LSB has recently left to join the Financial Conduct Authority. Crispin Passmore, 
former LSB strategy Director is now the Executive Director of the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority.  
69 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, ‘Regulation in the Public Interest’ (2007) 17 
Consumer Policy Review 4; Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, 
‘Citizens and Consumers: Discursive Debates During and After the 
Communications Act 2003’ (University of Kent, October 2006) 
<http://www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/papers/Livingstone%20Wk%20Paper10.(2).pdf> 
accessed 22 July 2014; Sonia Livingstone, Peter Lunt and Laura Miller, ‘Citizens, 
Consumers and the Citizen – Consumer: Articulating the Interests at Stake in 
Media and Communications Regulation’ (2007) 1 Discourse and Communication 
85, 97; Sonia Livingstone, ‘What is the Citizen’s Interest in Communication 
Regulation?: Ofcom’s Agenda for “Citizens, Communications and 
Convergence”’ (Conference Paper, LSE Research Online, 30 October 2008) 2 
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of the “new regulators”70 regulate in a similar way, using nearly identical 
“tools.” These regulatory tools have also failed to get to grips with 
concepts analogous to the citizen or public interest.71  
A casual review of the composition of the boards of the LSB, LSCP 
and SRA now reveals a membership of, on the whole, career board 
members often with past affiliations or current memberships of consumer 
organisations or competition promoting organisations.72 There is a loose 
similarity in the credentials, including academic and professional 
backgrounds, of many members of the various Boards which oversee the 
regulatory functions of the larger approved regulators. This again hints at 
many of the precepts of cultural capture outlined above. The similarity of 
the recent composition of the LSCP is something that has not escaped the 
attention of Baroness Ruth Deech who in a House of Lords Debate on 
referral fees noted:  
 
“There is a perception that the Legal Services Board Consumer 
Panel may fail the test of impartiality and expert evidence. After a 
freedom of information request, it was revealed that the panel has 
an unbalanced political composition. Half of its members are 
declared members of the Labour Party and/or members of unions-
the unions being, of course, supporters of the Labour Party. Why 
does this matter? Because there is a conflict between the duty to 
represent the consumer and certain vested interests that are not 
always transparently declared in, for example, the Consumer Panel 
report on referral fees, which was adopted by the parent body, the 
Legal Services Board. The Labour Party itself is in receipt of 
referral fees. Lord Justice Jackson, in his Review of Civil 
Litigation Costs earlier this year, said that they should be banned 
in personal injury cases. So did the noble Lord, Lord Young of 
(This work does not frame these observations in the context of capture or cultural 
capture).  
70 ‘New regulators’ is a term used commonly to describe a new breed of 
regulators brought about during the period of the Blair government. They were 
primarily concerned with economic regulation. They are variously lighter touch, 
public facing, risk centred, created by statute and funded by a levy on the industry 
they regulate and are usually accountable to parliament. See: Livingstone (n 69). 
71 Lunt (n 69).  
72 John Kay, ‘How to Spot a Good From a Bad Quango’ (Financial Times, 12 
October 2010) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc7ff2e4-d651-11df-81f0-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz36FPyHHM4 > accessed 25 October 2014; notably Kay 
referred to a modern class of ‘quangocrats’ who glide effortlessly from committee 
to committee. 
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Graffham, in his report on the claims culture. The Law Society has 
set its face against the practice. Therefore, it is odd that the LSB 
Consumer Panel has come out in favour of the retention of referral 
fees, whereby solicitors and others may buy in work by, for 
example, paying unions to refer business to them. Given that half 
of the Consumer Panel is made up of members of the Labour 
Party, the perception may be there-it is possible to make the 
criticism-that it could be influenced by the unwillingness of the 
party to give up a potential source of income from the firm of 
solicitors that acts on its behalf in personal injury cases.”73 
 
Returning to other ways in which capture may manifest itself, 
McCarty74 argues that the “provision of expertise by interest” – in which, 
as a result of heightened complexity, regulators come to rely on industry 
or interest groups expertise in ways that tilt decision making toward these 
particular interests. The very fact, as discussed later on in this paper that 
the LSB is duty bound to interact with the LSCP75 is a significant factor in 
any argument that a tilt has occurred in favour of the consumer interest. 
Moreover, the fact that the LSCP appears to repeatedly use certain 
research organisations, as does the LSB, shows a predisposition to 
particular ways of thinking.  
Zingales76 argues, that perhaps the most subtle of all methods of 
capture occurs by “economists capture” - in which industry or interest 
groups influences and incentivises scholars to favour a particular 
perspective in their work, thereby indirectly influencing regulators who 
rely on the scholars’ judgment and expertise in making decisions. The 
next section identifies the fact that the LSB and others have been explicit 
in their commitment to market failure analysis and cost benefit analysis, 
commonly following the Treasury’s Green Book methodology.77 These 
economic methodologies for decision making are also clearly to be found 
used in much of the research appropriated by the LSB despite market 
failure analysis coupled with cost benefit being roundly criticised.78 The 
73 Baroness Ruth Deech, HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722 col 170.  
74 McCarty (n 61). 
75 LSA 2007, ss 8-11.  
76 Zingales (n 60). 
77 HM Treasury, The Green Book Appraisal and Evaluation in Central 
Government (HMSO 2003). 
78 Christopher Decker and George Yarrow, Understanding the Economic 
Rationale for Legal Services Regulation (Legal Services Board, 2010) 12. 
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following interrogates the concept of the consumer interest and discusses 
the way in which it has become the focus of economic methodologies. 
  
3. THE CONSUMER INTEREST 
 
The LSA 2007 in part helps in the search for an understanding of the 
consumer. Of all the terms that appear in the regulatory objectives, the 
only one that is further defined in the Act is “consumer”. S 207(1) defines 
consumers as follows:  
Legal Services Act 2007, s 207(1)79 “consumers” means persons  
 
a) who use, have used or are, or may be contemplating using, 
services within (subsection 2)80  
b) who have rights or interests which are derived from, or are 
otherwise attributable to, the use of such services by other 
persons, or  
c) who have rights or interests which may be adversely 
affected by the use of such services by persons acting on 
their behalf or in a fiduciary capacity in relation to them 
 
This definition is broadly constructed, however, adding “interest”81 to 
it, to make “consumer interest,” presents more of a definitional challenge. 
Prominent scholars in the world of consumer affairs have concluded that 
the term consumer interest “resists a single definition” and is “highly 
politicised”.82 This is an experience borne out by many established 
regulators, who have made concerted efforts to understand what the 
79 LSA 2007, s 207(1).  
80 Ibid s 2(a): ‘any services provided by a person who is an authorised person in 
relation to an activity which is a reserved legal activity, and, (b) any other 
services provided by a person which consist of or include a legal activity carried 
on by, or on behalf of, that person.’ 
81 For the purposes of this paper, the term interest is not taken to be a sense of 
feeling or curiosity. Rather it relates to something being done, or enacted, or 
brought about, or maintained. It is a separate question from that of whether an 
individual must be aware of his interest. This approach broadly is an articulation 
of that commonly adopted in the literature pertaining to public interest 
scholarship. Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic 
Books 1970) 18. 
82 Stephen Broebeck, ‘Defining the Consumer Interest: Challenges for 
Advocates’ (2006) 40 Journal of Consumer Affairs 177, 178. 
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consumer interest is.83 Complex toolkits have been developed in the 
pursuit of diagnosing the consumer interest.84 Broebeck, has, however, 
noted that the consumer interest can be most usefully thought of in terms 
of “competition, representation, information and redress.”85 The Labour 
Government shed some light on its understanding of the consumer interest 
in the heated debates between itself and the House of Lords over proposed 
legislation, which later became the Communications Act 2003.86 To 
clarify the difference between the consumer and the citizen, borne out of a 
series of challenges to the language used in the Communications Bill 
presented to Parliament, the Government provided an explanatory 
memorandum.87 It noted that the consumer interest can be defined as the 
interest of a purchaser or other user of a good or service, normally based 
on an economic relationship between the individual and the supplier of the 
good or service in question.88 In comparison, the citizen interest may be 
defined as the interest of the individual in his or her capacity as a member 
of society and the public interest as the interest or good of society as a 
whole.89 In connection with the consumer interest, this has led scholars to 
note: “in a general sense one can define consumer interests in the market 
as related to four market characteristics of price, service, quality and 
choice.”90 
83 Ofcom, ‘Capturing the Consumer Interest: A Report of the Launch of the 
Toolkit for Regulators and Government’ (Ofcom, 2 February 2006) 
<http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/Policy/Consumer
%20InterestToolkit/Events/Capturing%20the%20Consumer%20Interest%20A%2
0report%20of%20the%20Launch%20etc.pdf > accessed 22 July 2014.  
84 LSCP, ‘The Consumer Interest – Using Consumer Principles Consumer 
Toolkit’ (LSCP, January 2014) 
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/ourwork/ConsumerEngagement/
documents/UsingConsumerPrinciples2014.pdf> accessed 18 August 2014. 
85 Broebeck (n 82).  
86 Communications Act 2003.  
87 DTI/DCMS, ‘Note by the Department of Trade and Industry and the 
Department for Culture. Media and Sport on the Meaning of “Customer”, 
“Consumer” and “Citizen”’ (Parliament, June 2002) <http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt200102/jtselect/jtcom/169/2070808.htm> accessed 22 
July 2014. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Eugène Buttigietg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest - A 
Comparative Analysis of US Antitrust Law and EC Competition Law (Wolters 
Kluwer 2009) 1. 
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This characterisation of the consumer, therefore, moves beyond a 
more general understanding of the consumer interest in terms of consumer 
rights and consumer protection. It reflects a more enhanced understanding 
of the consumer, as an individual with preferences and as a prime feature 
of the market. The Government’s focus on the consumer in the Legal 
Services Bill followed the trend embodied in its other public sector 
reforms. This leads therefore to an argument and hypothesis that 
“protecting and promoting the consumer interest” was concerned with 
ensuring the market mechanism worked effectively.91  
The market perspective of the consumer interest is arguably of critical 
importance, as in a number of situations the market may not be 
compatible with other socially desirable outcomes.92 Market failure is 
commonly used as the intellectual premise upon which many regulators 
approach regulation.93 It therefore provides a valuable lens with which to 
further view the consumer interest. The use of market failure is clearly 
apparent among many of the regulators created since 1997. The FSA94 
and the LSB95 explicitly note that they use this approach in the process of 
decision making regarding policy and regulation. There is evidence that 
91 There is clear evidence of this assertion in the following speeches by senior 
members of the Legal Services Board. Chris Kenny, ‘Alternative Business 
Structures and the Legal Services Market – Impact one Year on and Future 
Challenges’ (Speech at the Westminster Legal Policy Forum, 18 October 2012); 
David Edmonds, ‘Quality and Standards in a Liberalised Market’ (Address by the 
Chairman of the Legal Services Board, Russell Cooke Forum, 10 May 2012).  
92 For an outline account see Stephen Mayson, Legal Services Regulation and 
“The Public Interest” (Legal Services Institute 2011); for a more developed 
account: Mike Feintuck, The Public Interest in Regulation (OUP 2004); Barry 
Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest (Georgetown University Press 
2007); Deborah Satz, Why Some Things Should Not be for Sale: The Moral Limits 
of Markets (OUP 2010).  
93 Harry McVea ‘Financial Services Regulation under The Financial Services 
Authority: A Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis’ (2005) 64 CLJ 413. 
94 ‘Effective Inspection and Enforcement: Implementing the Hampton Vision in 
the Financial Services Authority’ (National Audit Office, 2008) 
<http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0708/hampton_financial_services_au.aspx> 
accessed 22 July 2014; McVea (n 93).  
95 Alex Roy, ‘Understanding the Economic Rationale for Legal Services 
Regulation’ (Legal Services Board, 2011)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/latest_news/pdf/econo
mics_of_legal_services_regulation_discussion_papers_publication_final.pdf> 
accessed 22 July 2014. 
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other regulators, including Ofcom96 commonly use this method, though 
they do not appear to have explicitly stated so, in the same way as the 
FSA and the LSB.97 The Government’s Green Book98 also mandates 
market failure analysis and cost benefit analysis as the principal rationale 
for government intervention regarding the operation of markets and 
institutions.99 The following outlines the theory, and then considers it as a 
tool for policy and decision making.  
The market failure theory is a consumer orientated theory of 
regulation,100 rooted in the idea that market forces are the best means of 
ensuring that consumers’ needs are met. Underlying the theory is the 
assumption that consumer preferences are more likely to be satisfied when 
firms engage in fierce and constant competition with each other. In the 
situation of a perfect market,101 the market is said to generate benefits for 
consumers in terms of price, innovation, quality, and variety of service 
(choice). These outcomes are only true under conditions of perfect 
competition.102 Given that markets are seldom perfect and suffer from a 
variety of deficiencies, regulation is justified when it aims to eliminate 
market failures and so restore a competitive equilibrium. The justifications 
for regulation under the market failure thesis are limited to instances of 
information asymmetries; externalities; anti-competitive practices and 
public goods.103 The economic justification for the market failure 
approach is that through market based transactions enshrined in the idea 
of mutually beneficial, voluntary exchanges – consumer preferences are 
best satisfied and scarce resources are shifted to where they are most 
valued on the basis of willingness to pay otherwise known as “allocative 
96 For an overall account of the market failure approach taken by Ofcom see: 
Tony Prosser, ‘Regulation and Social Solidarity’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and 
Society 364, 367 -369 
97 Roy (n 95). 
98 HM Treasury (n 77).  
99 Ibid. 
100 McVea (n 93).  
101 Ibid. 
102 Perfect competition presupposes: clearly defined property rights, non- natural 
monopolies; no barriers to entry; no transaction costs. 
103 Frank Stephen, ‘The Market Failure Justification for the Regulation of 
Professional Services Markets and the Characteristics of Consumers’ in Claus 
Dieter Ehlerman and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 
2004: The Relationship Between Competition Law and (Liberal) Professions 
(Hart Publishing 2004).  
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efficiency.”104 Market failure establishes, however, only a prima facie 
case for regulation, and in some instances the costs of regulation may 
outweigh any benefits. Market failure analysis is therefore often 
accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis.105 The consumer interest is, 
through this approach, essentially a by-product of the process of the 
market operating properly. The market, free of regulation, yields benefits 
in the consumer’s interest in terms of lower prices, more innovative 
services, better choice of services and better quality. However, within 
what is a relatively simple hypothesis, the consumer is construed 
narrowly. The following outlines some broad problems associated with 
the approach.  
The market failure theory is, by definition, rooted in the theory of 
private value and is driven by a concern for pricing efficiency.106 The 
narrowness of the approach has led to a number of studies which have 
shown that market failure negates broader public values, beyond the 
economic, and especially outcomes where the technical efficiency of 
prices is not a primary consideration.107 Bozeman108 notes that the 
pervasiveness of market failure reasoning ensures a built in conservatism 
in public policy which often results in the neglect of public values. This is 
because the model marginalises many collective values by simply not 
dealing with them. This raises an important point. The market, by 
definition, is concerned with individual values; it is not concerned with 
collective values which may be important to the whole of society. This is 
significant in matters to do with the law, the environment and culture. In 
regards to law, concepts such as the rule of law, access and administration 
of justice, honesty and dignity, duties to the court, reputation, 
sustainability, independence and ethics are not easily translated into 
values that can be expressed in monetary terms. The market failure model 
and the consumer are therefore just concerned with the market. It is not 
104 Ibid. 
105 HM Treasury (n 77) 52; McVea (n 93) 413. 
106 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest (Georgetown University 
Press 2007) 5. 
107 Richard Zerbe and Howard McCurdy ‘The Failure of Market Failure’ (1999) 
18 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 558 - The comprehensive critique 
analyses Lighthouses, Land Tenancy, Bees and Crops, Common Property, 
concluding that in each of these cases the theoretical proposition put forward by 
Market Failure when tested empirically was incorrect. The authors suggest that 
the correct normative theory rests on transaction costs, which is inherently based 
on significant empirical enquiry.  
108 Bozeman (n 106) 20. 
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concerned with other factors which may be of importance. Market failure, 
is, as Sagoff argues, a perfectly appropriate measure of the consumer’s 
interest.109 Interests can accurately be assessed in terms of price, which 
reveals what individuals are willing to pay to obtain what they want.110 He 
posits that the model deals with the efficiency of markets and how one 
knows that markets are not efficient. It is not, he asserts, about people and 
social institutions.111  
Despite these problems, market failure is widely used by policy 
makers and regulators. Decker and Yarrow have commented on the 
unreflective use of market failure analysis and concluded that analysts 
tend to jump straight from a finding of “market failure” to a conclusion 
that intervention is not just potentially warranted, rather, they omit further 
investigation and assert that intervention is actually warranted.112 Beyond 
this, there are a number of more subtle problems with the way in which 
the model constructs the preferences the market seeks to promote. The 
following sets these out.  
The traditional view of the free market is a presumption that what 
justifies regulation is market failure, or more specifically, the failure of 
the market by itself to achieve efficiency.113 The purpose of regulation 
under this model is to restore the market to its natural condition, or as 
close an approximation of that condition as can be hoped for.114 Efficiency 
in this context has been explained by Posner as follows: “Efficiency is a 
technical term: it means exploiting economic resources in such a way that 
human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay 
for goods and services is maximised.”115 Whilst, as noted, this approach is 
good at understanding the consumer’s interest, a number of scholars have 
queried whether the consumer interest is worth satisfying. Notably, Sagoff 
has argued: “an efficiency criterion assumes that the goals of our society 
are contained in the preferences individuals reveal or would reveal in 
109 Mark Sagoff, ‘Economic Theory and Environmental Law’ (1981) 79 
Michigan Law Review 1393. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Peter Brown, ‘The Failure of Market Failures’ (1992) 21 Journal of Socio 
Economics 1, 1-24; Brown argues that it is premised on shallow utilitarianism 
and as such is a prisoner to its foundations in economic individualism. 
112 Decker (n 78) 12.  
113 Edward Rubin, ‘Deregulation, Reregulation, and the Myth of the Market’ 
(1988) 45 Washington and Lee Law Review 1249, 1258. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Posner (n 44). 
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markets.”116 These individual preferences are not fixed,117 are 
subjective118 and reflect a number of cultural and maybe societal 
conditions.119 Further to this, these individual preferences are capable of 
changing. Were they not, there would be no place in the world for 
advertising, salespeople and consumer psychologists. The theory works on 
the premise that autonomously created, materially defined self-interests do 
exist, and it is the collective expression of these interests through market 
purchases which leads to optimal resource allocation.120 A critical 
argument flows from this that a preference satisfying policy will only be 
as good as the preferences as understood, and there is nothing that 
guarantees that the preferences will be the right ones, or ones worth 
having.121 Many examples abound to explain this point. Sagoff, frames the 
key issue as follows:  
 
“As consumers, indeed, we buy the least expensive goods, and in 
that way reveal a preference for lower worker safety standards, 
since they bring lower prices with them. Yet as citizens we may 
regard ourselves as Americans together and therefore responsible 
for the decency of workplace conditions. Likewise many of us 
who never visit a magnificent landscape may believe nevertheless 
that society has a duty to preserve it. Concerns such as these 
impersonal values rather than consumer preferences may become 
more important to us than our personal or economic interest.”122 
 
In the context of legal services, Stempel makes a similar point but 
builds on it by noting the importance of considering collective values in 
addition to individual consumer values in the context of the law.  
 
116 Mark Sagoff, ‘At the shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions 
are Not All Economic’ (1981) 23 ACJ 1283.  
117 Jane Barron and Jeffrey Dunoff ‘Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques 
of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory’ (1996) 17 Cardozo LR 431; Mark Sagoff 
‘On Preserving the Natural Environment (1974) 84 Yale LJ 205, 207. 
118 Stephen Broebeck, ‘Defining the Consumer Interest: Challenges for 
Advocates’ (2006) 40 Journal of Consumer Affairs 177, 178. 
119 Rubin (n 113) 1267.  
120 McVea (n 93) 441. 
121 Mark Sagoff, ‘The Principles of Federal Pollution Control’ (1986) 71 Minn L 
Rev 19, 58.  
122 Mark Sagoff, ‘Values and Preferences’ (1986) 96 Ethics 301, 311.  
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“As a consumer, I am a participant in markets. My aim is to 
enhance my own well-being, by satisfying my preferences, which 
I express through market behaviour. As a citizen, my concern is 
different. It is a concern not with what is best for me but with what 
is right for us. My aim is to participate in deliberation with my 
fellows, and I consider not only my preferences but my (and our) 
values as well. Frequently, my consumer preferences coincide 
with the values I support as a citizen; sometimes, however, they do 
not. Because our aims as consumers and citizens are somewhat 
schizophrenic, public and private life both require a never-ending 
negotiation between consumer values and citizen values.” 123 
 
The focus on consumer preferences alone is not desirable. McVea124 
argues that consumer preferences “tells us nothing about, indeed, it seems 
unconcerned with whether –those preferences are worth having.”125 This 
is not an isolated assertion. Sagoff suggests that it cannot be argued that 
the satisfaction of preferences is a good thing in itself for many 
preferences are sadistic, envious, racist or unjust.126 Furthermore, in the 
context of preferences, McVea has noted that markets also pander to 
particular types of preferences (more is better than enough) and tend to 
systematically favour the lowest common-denominator amongst the 
spectrum of consumer preferences.127 What emerges from the foregoing is 
that one of the main methods of regulators decision making is largely 
predicated on both a narrow conception of the consumer interest, and 
secondly, is compromised in considering collective interests that may 
affect society as a whole. The market model is concerned with the market. 
There is little in the model which can discern when the consumer interest 
is compatible with the public interest, or when it is not. The market model 
pursues the market vision, irrespective of whether this is in the collective 
public interest or not. This raises a number of questions as to whether this 
is an appropriate method of approaching the regulation of legal services.  
 
123 Jeffrey Stempel, ‘Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business 
Paradigm for Conceptualising and Regulating the Legal Profession’ (1999) 27 
Florida State University Law Review 120. 
124 McVea (n 93). 
125 Jane Barron and Jeffrey Dunoff, ‘Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques 
of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory’ (1996) 17 Cardozo LR 431; Sagoff (n 
117); McVea (n 93); Sagoff (n 122) 
126 Sagoff (n 121).  
127 McVea (n 93). 
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4. STRUCTURAL POSITIONING OF THE CONSUMER 
INTEREST 
 
Understanding the problems with the consumer interest and the way in 
which it is commonly located within decision making processes is 
important in any overall determination of consumer capture, as it locates 
the objection towards regulators regulating in its interest without 
thoughtful consideration of the public interest. This section considers 
some factors which, in part, may explain the emphasis accorded to the 
consumer interest by the LSB. The following outlines the socio-political 
and economic influences which led to the emphasis afforded to the 
consumer interest in the LSA 2007. The following argues that the LSA 
2007 is both stylistically and substantively a piece of economic regulation 
– drafted in a style that presents a number of interesting and, as yet, 
unresolved questions. It argues that the method of regulation, 
characteristic of the early years of the millennium, spawning a number of 
QUANGO regulators, has, through a form of “Group Sync” and New 
Public Management128 influences, come to regulate in the consumer 
interest because it is amenable to relatively simplistic quantification and 
apparently transparent regulation. Whilst the Legal Services Bill was 
drafted with a strong economic and consumer emphasis, absent any 
reference to the public interest – this paper reiterates the fact that the 
overriding purpose of regulation is to further the public interest. Whilst 
this is a simple matter of understanding for most, the explanatory notes to 
the LSA 2007 are Delphic and vague. Without promoting a clear 
hierarchy of regulatory objectives with the public interest at the top, it is 
perhaps understandable, but unforgivable, that regulators have sought to 
prioritise the consumer interest. The following section also draws 
attention to the statutory creation of the LSCP and its very close 
relationship with the LSB. This section challenges this narrowly 
constructed formalised champion of the consumer interest within the LSB 
whilst noting that no other interest group is accorded such a privilege. The 
final argument made is that there is a long-standing recognition that 
charging a regulator with being a champion of both the consumer interest 
and the public interest is a problematical combination which might come 
to have serious consequences.  
128 ‘New Public Management’. This prioritises the efficiency of public sector 
administration rather than an orientation towards broader values which many 
regard as important. Consequently, a burgeoning area of study is to be found 
attempting to reconnect public services and management to public values; 
Bozeman (n 106).  
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There has been a long pedigree of claims, extending over 40 years, 
that the legal profession and legal services market should be liberalised.129 
Many accounts set out the background to these claims.130 It was only in 
and around the early years of the Millennium that a number of catalysts 
coalesced to provide the requisite political will and potential for achieving 
a successful outcome for a piece of far reaching legislation reforming 
legal services. The Labour Government’s appetite for reforming the legal 
professions was perhaps most advantaged, politically, by a highly 
publicised problem with the handling of complaints made against 
Solicitors.131 This problem fuelled a co-ordinated and sustained campaign 
129 MMC, A Report on the General Effect on the Public Interest of Certain 
Restrictive Practices (HMSO 1970); OECD, Competition in Professional 
Services (DAFFE/CLP 2000); Royal Commission on Legal Services, The Royal 
Commission on Legal Services in England and Wales: Final Report (HMSO 
1979); Robin White, A Guide to the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 
(Fourmat Publishing 1991); Richard Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and 
State (OUP 2004); Great Britain, The Work and Organisation of the Legal 
Profession (Stationary Office Books 1989); Great Britain, Conveyancing by 
Authorised Practitioners (Stationery Office Books 1989); Great Britain, 
Contingency Fees (HMSO 1989); Michael Zander, ‘The Thatcher Government’s 
Onslaught on the Lawyers: Who Won?’ (1990) 24 International Law 753, 759; 
Laurel S Terry, ‘The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in 
Professional Services’ (2009) 29 Northwestern Journal of International Law and 
Business1, 1-10; Iain Paterson and others, ‘Economic Impact of Regulation in the 
Field of Liberal Professions in Different Member States: Regulation of 
Professional Services’ (IHS,2003)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional_services/studies/prof_servi
ces_ihs_part_1.pdf> accessed 11 July 2014; DCA, Competition and Regulation in 
the Legal Services Marketplace (CP(R2) 2003) 20; Michael Zander, Lawyers and 
the Public Interest (Weidenfeld Nicolson 1968). 
130 Richard Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State (OUP 2004); Judith 
L Maute, ‘Revolutionary Changes to the English Legal Profession or Much Ado 
About Nothing?’ (2006) 17 Professional Lawyer 1, 7; Mary Seneviratne, 
‘Consumer Complaint and the Legal Profession: Making Self Regulation Work?’ 
(2000) 7 International Journal of the Legal Profession 39; Mary Seneviratne, The 
Legal Profession: Regulation and the Consumer (Sweet and Maxwell 1999) ch 5; 
Mark Davies, ‘The Regulatory Crisis in the Solicitors Profession’ (2003) 6 Legal 
Ethics 2; Robert Baldwin and others, ‘Regulating Legal Services: Time for the 
Big Bang’ (2004) 67 MLR 787. 
131 Richard Moorhead, ‘Self-Regulation and the Market for Legal Services’ 
(Cardiff Working Papers, 2004)  
<http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/archives/publications/2004/moorheadpaper.pdf> 
accessed 19 August 2014; Mary Seneviratne, ‘Consumer Complaint and the 
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by a number of consumer organisations – who for a long time had been 
challenging the perceived monopoly of the legal profession. The OFT’s 
interest in reform, buoyed by a number of developments in the EU and at 
the OECD also meant that the time was ripe for change.132 What has been 
overlooked by many commentators was the fact that the Legal Services 
Bill was introduced to Parliament at a time where the Labour Government 
was preoccupied with pursuing a neo-liberal, consumer friendly inspired 
deregulation agenda.133 The result being that the Legal Services Bill was 
drafted along strictly economic lines.134 That is to say it was a piece of 
economic regulation in all but name. This in part explains the insertion of 
regulatory objectives – which are a drafting feature of regulation, and 
primarily economic regulation at that time. In essence, the consumer 
lobby and Government were simultaneously pursuing an outcome which 
sought to improve the lot of the consumer through market means. To 
illustrate this point, the public interest, which had until 2002 appeared as a 
term in many of the documents evaluating the legal professions, was given 
Legal Profession: Making Self Regulation Work?’ (2000) 7 International Journal 
of the Legal Profession 39. 
132 OFT, Competition in Professions (OFT 328, 2001); OFT, Competition in 
Professions – Progress Statement (OFT 385, 2002)  
133 Stephen Broebeck, ‘Defining the Consumer Interest: Challenges for 
Advocates’ (2006) 40 Journal of Consumer Affairs 177, 178; Michelle Everson, 
‘Legal Construction of the Consumer’ in Frank Trentmann (ed), The Making of 
the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World  
(BERG 2005); John Clarke, Janet Newman and Louise Westmarland, ‘Creating 
Citizen-Consumers? Public Service Reform and (un)Willing Selves’ in Sabine 
Maasen and Barbara Sutter (eds), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics and the 
Challenge of Neuroscience (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 125–145; Thomas Frank, 
One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism and the End of 
Economic Democracy (Anchor Books 2001) 25; Wendy Larner, ‘Neo-Liberalism: 
Policy, Ideology, Governmentality’ (2000) 63 Studies in Political Economy 5. 
134 The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators (HL 2006-
2007, 189-I; The Select Committee on Regulators, UK Economic Regulators (HL 
2006-2007, 189-II) The report focuses on economic regulators. Whilst the LSA 
2007did not necessarily set out to create a specific economic regulator, the Legal 
Services Board has clearly acknowledged that it views a rather substantial part of 
its statutory remit as creating this responsibility. ‘If we’re not an economic 
regulator, why on earth did Parliament write in all the stuff in the Act about 
bringing in alternative business structures? What is that, if not breaking down 
barriers to entry in a form of economic regulation?’; Legal Futures ‘Edmonds 
Comes Out Fighting’ (Legal Futures, 27 April 2012) 
<http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/edmonds-comes-out-fighting-in-
defence-of-lsb> accessed 23 July 2014.  
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scant consideration after Lord Chancellor Irving left office. The term 
public interest did not feature in any of the documents, reports or 
consultations in the period 2002- 2007. 
As a result of the successful passage of the LSA 2007 this brought 
about a number of regulatory innovations which, in one way or another, 
can be seen in other pieces of regulation. Similar to the LSA 2007 the 
Communications Act 2003 gave birth to a QUANGO oversight regulator. 
Studies reveal that there is a degree of similarity of approach in the ways 
in which these regulators regulate.135 In particular they hold themselves 
out to be evidenced based regulators. However, the approaches taken 
towards evidence and transparent regulation have yielded some interesting 
results. The Hampton136 requirement for transparent decision making has, 
in line with the neo liberal inspired “New Public Management” approach 
sought methods by which regulatory decisions can be defended. As 
mentioned earlier in this paper – market failure coupled with cost benefit 
analysis is these regulators stock in trade. Naturally this means that 
consumer interested policies are prioritised because these simplistic 
economic tools provide a methodology by which regulators can defend 
their decisions. Moreover, it provides a panacea by which ideologies of 
the regulators may be aired.137 Studies reveal that other regulators have 
been unable, unwilling or incapable of making, or taking, decisions 
135 Lunt (n 69). 
136 The following five principles were identified by the Better Regulation Task 
Force in 1997 – otherwise known as the Hampton Principles. Regulatory 
activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and 
targeted only at cases in which action is needed. These principles are inserted 
specifically in the Act at LSA 2007, pt 2, s 3(a). 
137 As an example – See David Edmonds: ‘We have a very simple goal – to 
reform and modernise the legal services marketplace in the interests of 
consumers, enhancing quality, ensuring value for money and improving access to 
justice across England and Wales’; Legal Services Board, ‘Strategic Plan 2012-
15 Business Plan 2012/13’ (LSB, April 2012)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/publications/pdf/busin
ess_plan_201213_final.pdf> accessed 30 April 2014, 11; David Edmonds: ‘We 
want regulators to step back from dictating the services offered and the structures 
of businesses operating in the legal services market to allow market forces to play 
a greater role. This we believe will help create a legal services market that is the 
right size for consumers.’ David Edmonds, ‘Regulatory Standards and assessing 
regulatory performance’ (Legal Compliance Bulletin, 2012)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/speeches_presentation
s/2012/legal_compliance_bulletin_article_issue_20_july_2012.pdf> accessed 30 
April 2014.  
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orientated by the public interest or the citizen interest – for reasons to do 
with both the method of regulating and ideological predispositions.138  
The draft Legal Services Bill appeared without a regulatory objective 
to protect and promote the public interest. This was rectified in the House 
of Lords after significant debate. In some regards the debates in the House 
of Lords might well have ameliorated some of the effects of capture by 
the consumer lobby. The background to the LSA 2007 set its sights 
ideologically on promoting the consumer. This was synonymous with the 
Labour Government’s policy disposition at the time. Therefore, from the 
start, the legislation has been orientated towards the consumer. This 
emphasis has, in a way proved rather difficult to rationalise when it comes 
to understanding the regulatory objectives. The explanatory notes to the 
Act provide that the regulatory objectives are not ranked in terms of any 
importance. This is something that the LSB has been keen to point out. 
However, for anyone acquainted with regulatory theory – regulation 
should promote and protect the public interest. Any argument to the 
alternative is wholly misguided. However, as has been noted in this paper, 
the public interest is an amorphous concept and apt to be manipulated in a 
way which can give rise to outcomes which are not in the public interest. 
In a sense, when it comes to the interpretation of the regulatory objectives 
– the public interest is easily subordinated or subverted. To understand the 
public interest requires much consideration from a regulator with 
ideological neutrality. David Edmonds and Chris Kenny of the LSB have 
never recanted in their frequent speeches and presentations from 
eulogising about the wisdom of free market economics, the capacity of 
markets to operate largely free of regulation and finally the benefits of 
protecting consumers and consumerism. Therefore, whilst it is clear that 
the ideological disposition of the LSB has pursued these ideas – it is in 
part, the drafting of the LSA 2007 that might be challenged for not more 
robustly framing the public interest as the principle purpose of regulation.  
The LSB’s own interpretation of the public interest which equates it 
with “public confidence” bears testament to the ease with which the 
regulator has been able to decide, largely unchallenged, what the public 
interest is.139 As has been rightly identified – even if “public confidence” 
138 Lord Currie, Chair of Ofcom, was so incensed that he is on record as saying 
that the wording of the Communications Act confused the clear vision of Ofcom 
as an economic regulator See: Lord Currie, (English National Forum Seminar 
Speech, 7 July 2003) <http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2003/07/07/english-national-
forum-seminar/> accessed 12 August 2014.  
139 Legal Services Board, Business Plan 2010-2011 (LSB, 2010). 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/publications/pdf/final_
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were an appropriate encapsulation of the public interest, which it is not, 
the absence of a caveat that it must be “justifiable public confidence” 
leaves much to be desired.140 In short, structurally, in an assessment of 
capture of regulation – the LSA 2007 provides the conditions through 
which emphasis may be accorded to other regulatory objectives as 
opposed to the public interest.  
Evidence of potential consumer capture by those advocating the 
consumer interest in the period leading to the LSA 2007 is again apparent 
in the text of the Act. Whereas the previous paragraph might be explained 
as emphasis being accorded to the consumer interest as a result of 
omission – that is to say insufficient attention was given to framing the 
public interest as the objective to which all other objectives must be 
subordinated – this section deals with a matter of commission. Part 2 
Section 8 LSA 2007 requires the LSB to establish a Legal Services 
Consumer Panel to represent the interest of consumers.141 The LSCP may 
make such arrangements as it thinks fit for committees established by the 
panel to give advice to the panel about matters.142 The LSCP makes its 
own arrangements for procedures, committee structures and decision 
making. The LSB must consider any representation made to it by the 
LSCP.143 If the LSB disagrees with the LSCP on a view expressed or a 
proposal made, in the representations, it must give the LSCP a notice to 
that effect stating reasons for disagreeing144 The LSCP may publish such 
information as it thinks fit about any representation made by the LSB. In 
essence the LSCP can say what it wishes and it has a right to publicly 
disagree with the LSB – even after the LSB has set out its reasons for 
disagreeing. The function of the LSCP is “to carry out research for the 
Board’ and ‘give advice to the Board.” The LSB is mandated to consider 
any advice given and the results of any research carried out under this 
section.145 The LSCP website notes: 
 
“We are located inside the Legal Services Board which allows us 
to put across the consumer view from the beginning to the end of 
annual_plan_2010.pdf> accessed 15 August 2012 (this document sets out the 
LSB’s interpretation of the regulatory objectives).  
140 David Neuberger, ‘Professional Discipline – Challenges for the Future’ 
(Keynote Speech, Disciplinary Conference, 5 February 2010). 
141 LSA 2007, pt 2, s 8.  
142 LSA 2007, pt 2, s 9.  
143 LSA 2007, pt 2, s 10(1).  
144 LSA 2007, pt 2, s 10(2).  
145 LSA 2007, pt 2, s 11(2).  
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the policy-making process. However, the Consumer Panel is fully 
independent of the Board – we commission and carry out 
independent research, advise the LSB on the interests of 
consumers, and scrutinise the LSB’s work on behalf of 
consumers.”146 
 
The intricate details of how the LSB and LSCP interact and how the 
latter is funded are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 
2010. The point to be taken from the mere existence of the LSCP – is that 
no other interest group is represented so completely and closely at the 
heart of the oversight regulator and legal services regulation. No public 
interest panel, rule of law panel or professional lawyering panel exists. 
Suggestions were made that there should be a panel to represent the legal 
profession during the debates on the Legal Services Bill in the House of 
Lords – but this was roundly rejected.147 The extent to which there is a 
sharing of information and approach by the LSCP and LSB – in part- 
explains some of the arguments posited below. For present purposes, 
however, the structure of the legislation and the direct representation of 
the consumer at the heart of legal services regulation links to another 
point, first raised by Ben Lewis in the 1930’s concerning research 
undertaken into the National Recovery Board in America, an initiative 
created during the first New Deal project.148 He drew attention to the 
following critical point:  
 
“to place any official in the position of having to represent both 
the public interest and the consumer interest is to make him both 
the judge of all parties and counsel for one of the parties at 
interest.”149  
  
146 LSB and LSCP, ‘Memorandum of Understanding Between LSB and LSCP’ 
(LSB, 14 January 2010)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/corporate_documen
ts/documents/MOU_LSB_CONSUMERPANEL.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014. 
147 Lord Kingsland HL Deb 15 May 2007 vol 692 pt 86.  
148 The 1997 Labour Government used the ideological label ‘New Deal’, based 
loosely on the ideas that underpinned the first ‘New Deal’.  
149 Ben Lewis, ‘The “Consumer” and “Public” Interests under Public Regulation’ 
(1938) 46 Journal of Political Economy 97, 100. 
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It is perhaps no coincidence that after the failure of the financial 
system in 2007,150 there was a scramble to re-organise the architecture of 
the Financial Services Authority, which had previously been responsible 
for a whole host of matters, including prudential regulation of the 
financial services industry in the wider public interest and consumer 
protection in the consumers’ interest.151 The Financial Services Act 
2010,152 comprehensively split these functions up to include the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (concentrating on economic and financial stability), 
the Economic Crime Agency and the Financial Conduct Authority 
(concentrating on the conduct of business regulation). The latter now has a 
much less consumer orientated role than originally undertaken by the 
Financial Services Authority.153 
The foregoing has sought to explain that there are a number of factors 
built into the fabric of the LSA 2007 which might explain why the product 
of regulation is now orientated towards the consumer interest. On this 
basis alone there remains an interesting avenue of work to assess the 
extent to which the LSA 2007 was itself the subject of capture by those 
with a consumer interest. The following moves away from considering 
these inherent features of the LSA 2007 to consider how the LSB has 
approached 3 instances of regulatory decision making.  
 
5. CONSUMER CAPTURE -REFERRAL FEES, LAY CHAIRS 
AND THE LETR  
 
Referral fees involve payments by lawyers to organisations who are in 
a position to secure potential clients eg estate agents, insurance companies 
and trade unions. The subject of referral fees has been very 
150 Evan Turgeon, ‘Boom and Bust for Whom? The Economic Philosophy behind 
the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 4 Virginia Law and Business Review 1.  
151 Financial Services Act 2010.  
152 Ibid. 
153 This was previously going to be named the Consumer Protection and Markets 
Authority. Attention has been focused on the change of name in the following 
paper: – James Perry et al, ‘The new UK regulatory Landscape’ (2011) 84 
Compliance Officer Bulletin 1-33 whereby it was noted that ‘branding the CMPA 
as a consumer champion would be inappropriate, confusing and potentially 
dangerous. The job of a regulator is to ensure that regulation is effective and 
proportionate. That requires a balance between preventing abusive behaviour and 
ensuring that regulation does not impose excessive costs and restrictions. See also 
Nathan Willmott, ‘Equipping the Modern Regulator: Assessing the New 
regulatory Powers under the Financial Services Act 2010’ (2010) 78 Compliance 
Officer Bulletin, 1-28.  
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controversial.154 Following the OFT “Competition in the Profession’s 
Report” in 2000,155 the Law Society changed its regulations to allow 
referral fees in 2004, as this form of restriction was regarded as being anti-
competitive.156 The rationale was that there was no apparent reason why 
an out-right ban on referral fees could be regarded as proportionate. It was 
argued that they would benefit access to justice by providing a less 
intimidating way of accessing lawyers. Five years after the Law Society 
relaxed its regulatory rules to allow referral fees, the Law Society voted to 
support a ban on referral fees.157 In the interim period an industry of 
claims management companies emerged. Certain law firms were buying 
blocks of claims that had been assembled by claims management 
companies. The Law Society’s objections to referral fees were based on 
the following arguments: (1) The financial relationship between lawyers 
and introducers had the potential to lead to the needs of the referrer being 
placed above those of the client; (2) Law firms having become reliant on 
buying work from claims management companies had framed their 
business plans accordingly meaning that, through competition, claims 
management companies would sell work to the highest bidder. (3) Given 
that there is no certainty that a claim would be successful, and that the 
cost of the referral fee had to be recovered, referral fees added 
unnecessary costs to legal advice because a percentage of cases have to be 
won to compensate for those that have not. This, it was argued, could lead 
to lower quality advice as lawyers would be forced to cut corners to 
deliver advice and make profits. (4) A further argument was made that 
referral fees cut choice and access to justice by pushing consumers to use 
referred lawyers, as opposed to the most appropriate lawyers and/ or the 
154 John Cooper, ‘Referral Fees: Corrupt and Criminal’ (2012) 176 Criminal Law 
and Justice Weekly 29; Katherine Dillon, ‘Referral Fees and PI- the Way 
Forward?’ (2007) 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law 324. 
155 OFT, Competition in Professions (OFT328, 2001).  
156 Paula Rohan, ‘Law Society Votes to Allow Referral Fees’ (Law Society 
Gazette, 9 January 2004) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-society-votes-
allow-referral-fees-0> accessed 22 July 2014; Law Society, ‘Referral Fees: An 
Overview’ (The Law Society, 7 March 2006)  
<http://governance.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/meeting/201322/SRA_Board_Paper
_Public_Item_8_-_Referral_Fees.pdf> accessed 22 July 2014  
157James Dean, ‘Law Society Council Votes Against Referral Fees’ (Law Society 
Gazette Online, 2009) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-society-council-
votes-against-referral-fees> accessed 22 July 2014.  
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best quality.158 The Law Society noted that a number of personal injury 
claims were dealt with by what have been termed “Personal Injury 
factories”, employing a largely unqualified workforce. Overall the Law 
Society deemed that referral fees were doing untold damage to the 
reputation of the profession.159  
In light of the new competitive environment brought about by the 
LSA 2007 and changes to legal aid funding that lawyers were faced with 
in 2009, it would be easy to dismiss the claims of the Law Society as 
reactionary and protectionist. However, in 2009 Lord Justice Jackson, 
undertaking a comprehensive review of civil litigation costs, advocated a 
ban on referral fees in personal injury cases for similar reasons to those 
outlined above. The report noted the inappropriateness of having victims 
of personal injuries traded as commodities. The report also argued that the 
culture of ambulance chasing had led to the commoditisation of claims160 
leading to serious problems in the insurance industry. This was largely 
because the merits of claims were seldom assessed until they reached the 
hands of lawyers, and that even then many claims were pursued 
regardless.161 The cost of litigation meant that it was more cost effective 
for many insurance companies to settle cases rather than try and defend 
them. The problem was that this had resulted in an inexorable rise in 
insurance premiums. The report also highlighted the fact that referrers 
simply referred cases to the highest bidder and that this was inappropriate 
from the perspective of justice.162  
The LSB began a review of referral fees in 2009 in response to the 
Law Society’s vote to ban them. In 2010 the LSB published proposals for 
a consultation. It then published the consultation. The executive summary 
in the consultation document noted that the LSB considered neither an 
outright ban nor a “free for all” to be appropriate, but that there should be 
increased transparency.163 It would appear that the Board had made up its 
158 The Law Society, ‘Law Society Statement on Referral Fees’ (The Law Society, 
2011) <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/press-releases/law-society-statement-
on-referral-fees/> accessed 22 July 2014. 
159 Dean (n 157); The Law Society (n 158). 
160 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, (TSO, January 2010) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/jackson-final-
report-140110.pdf> accessed 23 July 2014, 204-6. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Legal Services Board, ‘Referral Fees, Referral Arrangements and Fee Sharing 
– Discussion Document on the Regulatory Treatment of Referral Fees, Referral 
Arrangements and Fee Sharing’ (LSB, September 2010)  
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mind before publishing the consultation. Prior to publishing this 
consultation the LSB had asked the LSCP to consider the subject. They 
produced a report,164 drawing on research conducted by Vanilla 
Research.165 This research had suggested that there was maybe a case for 
requiring more transparency when a client’s referral would result in the 
introducer receiving a payment. The substance of Vanilla Research’s 
research was a relatively small number of interviews and group 
discussions based on perceptions and preferences about making a claim. 
Based on this arguably limited research the LSCP made a case that 
referral fees should be retained. They did not seek to assess anything other 
than the interests of the consumer. The LSB also commissioned Charles 
River Associates166 to consider a cost benefit case for referral fees. Their 
methodology was based on market failure theory. Charles River 
Associates reported no problems with conveyancing referrals. They found 
no evidence to suggest that referral fees in personal injury cases were 
causing consumer detriment and advised that referral fees were unlikely to 
be problematical.167 The cost benefit analysis included in the report makes 
no reference to factors extending beyond consumer detriment and the 
consumer interest.168  
The LSB sought views on its 2010 consultation and on the 
conclusions that it had initially arrived at, based on the LSCP’s opinion 
and the Charles River report. A report combining these findings, with 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/pdf/20100929_referral_fees.
pdf> accessed 29 July 2014.  
164 Vanilla Research is a small market research consultancy specialising in 
consumer perceptions. Vanilla Research, ‘Referral Arrangements Research’ 
(Vanilla Research, March 2010)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/research_and_repor
ts/documents/VanillaResearch_ConsumerResearch_ReferralArrangements.pdf 
accessed > accessed 29 July 2014. This report was based on ten group discussions 
with consumers or potential consumers.  
165 Legal Services Consumer Panel, ‘Referral Fees’ (LSCP, May 2010) 
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/research_and_repor
ts/documents/ConsumerPanel_ReferralArrangementsReport_Final.pdf > accessed 
29 July 2014.  
166 Charles River Associates ‘Cost Benefit Analysis of Policy Options Related to 
Referral Fees in Legal Services’ (Charles River Associates, May 2010) 
<http://governance.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/meeting/185852/Consultant_report_
on_referral_fees_May2010.pdf> accessed 22 July 2014. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Charles River Associates (n 166). 
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those of various stakeholders was published in September 2010.169 In this 
report, the LSB posed a series of further questions and asked for 
stakeholders to respond.170 Drawing heavily on the LSCP and the report 
prepared by Charles River, the LSB argued that it had developed robust 
evidence upon which to base its opinions. The final decision of the LSB 
was to not recommend banning referral fees, but instead to introduce 
requirements for transparency. The requirement for transparency meant 
that consumers would have to be apprised of the fact that a referral fee had 
been paid by a lawyer to the intermediary that introduced the lawyer to the 
consumer. This decision was published in May 2011.171 The 
recommendation for enhanced transparency has since been regarded as 
both aspirational and unworkable.172 However, the extent to which the 
LSB followed the advice proffered by the LSCP is clear to see from the 
following excerpt from a letter sent by Chairman David Edmonds to the 
then Chair of the LSCP, Diana Hayter:  
 
“Your advice to us has been invaluable and was central to the 
proposals we consulted on in September. Your advice set out a 
persuasive analysis of the impact of referral fees on consumers 
and was backed by empirical research which has ensured that 
consumers’ views were fed into the process directly. Your 
conclusion of ‘reveal, regulate so retain’ was the basis for our 
discussions and has remained fundamental to our final decisions 
on referral fees.”173 
169 Legal Services Board, ‘Referral Fees, Referral Arrangements and Fee Sharing 
– Discussion Document on the Regulatory Treatment of Referral Fees, Referral 
Arrangements and Fee Sharing’ (LSB, September 2010) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/pdf/20100929_referral_fees.
pdf> accessed 27 July 2014. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Legal Services Board, ‘Referral Fees, Referral Arrangements and Fee Sharing 
Decision Document’ (LSB, May 2011)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/201
10527_referral_fees_decision_press_release_final4.pdf> accessed 24 July 2014 
172 Legal Futures, ‘Straw: Legal Services Board report on referral fees was 
“gobbledegook”’ (Legal Futures, 29 September 2011) < 
http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/news/straw-Legal Services Board-report-on-
referral-fees-was-gobbledegook> accessed 12 July 2014. 
173 Legal Services Board, ‘Letter from David Edmonds to Dianna Hayter on 
Referral Fees’ (LSB, 26 May 2011) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/201
10526_letter_david_edmonds_to_Dianne_Hayter.pdf> accessed 14 August 2014.  
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On the 9 September 2011, the Government announced that referral 
fees in personal injury cases should be banned and that it was taking steps 
to bring about legislation to this effect. In a written ministerial statement, 
Jonathan Djanogly174 noted that the current arrangements had led to the 
growth of an industry that actively encouraged individuals to bring cases, 
regardless of the merits of their claim, and spoke of the effect on 
insurance premiums. He also spoke of the serious effect on the reputation 
and integrity of the legal profession.175 On 26 October 2011, Ken 
Clarke176 announced that he was tabling amendments to the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill to ban referral fees in 
connection with personal injury claims.177 The amendment was agreed to. 
Section 56 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 now prohibits referral fees in personal injury claims.178 The Law 
Society and the Bar, along with others, including a cross section of the 
Government, remains committed to banning referral fees outright.179  
It is clear from the foregoing that the combination of the LSCP’s 
research and the cost benefit analysis undertaken by the economic and 
business consulting firm, Charles River Associates, was deemed sufficient 
to address the public interests associated with referral fees.180 In 
particular, in arriving at their decision, the LSB noted:  
 
“our scrutiny has been focused on the regulatory treatment of 
referral fees, assessed against the regulatory objectives set out in 
Section 1 of the Legal Services Act 2007. We do not offer a view 
174 Parliamentary Under- Secretary of State for Justice.  
175 Ministry of Justice press release, Better protection from intruders and 
excessive compensation costs, 26 October 2011. 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/features/feature261011a> accessed 24 July 
2014. 
176 Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor.  
177 HC Deb 1 November 2011 cc822-849.  
178Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 c 10 pt 2 s 60  
179 The Bar Council, ‘Bar Council Welcomes move to ban Referral Fees but calls 
for Further Action’ (Bar Council, 9 September 2011) 
<http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media-centre/news-and-press-
releases/2011/september/bar-council-welcomes-move-to-ban-referral-fees-but-
calls-for-further-action/> accessed 22 July 2014;  
Catherine Baksi, ‘OFT Calls for Referral Fee Payment Regulation’ ( Law Society 
Gazette, 25th February 2014) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/law-society-
council-votes-against-referral-fees> accessed 22 July 2014.  
180 Legal Services Board (n 171). 
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on any wider public policy arguments for their retention or 
abolition.”181 
 
This assertion, coupled with the consumer and economic research 
relied on by the LSB rather begs the question what does the LSB actually 
consider the regulatory objective of ‘protecting and promoting the public 
interest’ to involve? There was no reference to the public interest in any of 
the documents published by the LSB. The force of the arguments from the 
Law Society, The Bar,182 Lord Justice Jackson, The Association of British 
Insurers, the former Lord Chancellor Jack Straw183 and, in part, the Office 
of Fair Trading were apparently not considered. Arguably they reflected 
the public interest, whereas the LSB seemingly favoured the findings of 
the LSCP and the research from Charles River Associates.184 This 
assertion is bolstered by the following response to a question posed by a 
member of the House of Commons Justice Committee regarding the 
LSB’s approach to referral fees and whether the Board had been 
complacent in the approach it had taken to referral fees. David Edmonds, 
Chair of the Board responded as follows:  
 
“I think ‘complacency’ is not a word I would use. When my Board 
was set up, we instituted a consumer panel that did a significant 
tranche of research into this area and produced a report that said 
they could not see consumer detriment arising from the 
administration of referral fees in the legal services sector. The 
Secretary of State and Parliament took a different view in terms of 
181 Ibid. 
182 Bar Council, ‘Joint Response of the Bar council and Criminal Bar Association 
to the Legal Services Board Discussion Document on the Regulatory Treatment 
of Referral Fees, Referral Arrangements and Fee Sharing’ (Legal Services Board, 
21 December 2010)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/join
t_response_of_the_bar_council_and_criminal_bar_association.pdf > accessed 29 
July 2014.  
183 Legal Futures (n 172). 
184 Paradoxically, despite the ban, it is likely that is that Alternative Business 
Structures, it will be easy to circumvent the referral fee ban in the future. John 
Hyde, ‘SRA Powerless to Stop ABS Circumventing Referral Fee Ban’ (Law 
Society Gazette, 13 June 2012) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/sra-
powerless-stop-abss-circumventing-referral-ban> accessed 29 July 2014.  
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personal injury, and that part of the referral fee process has now 
been banned.” 185 
 
“I am both defensive and protective of our stance on referral fees. 
As a regulator with an interest in economic regulation, I like to see 
markets operating in a way in which markets can operate, which is 
that referrals are made, satisfactory solutions are found and you 
don’t intervene where there is no evidence that you should 
intervene. I guess there is a degree not of complacency but of 
agnosticism on the part of my board, fuelled by the report of my 
own consumer panel. If anyone was going to complain about, or 
find evidence of, consumer detriment, it would be in the research 
that they commissioned in this area, and they didn’t find any. That 
is why, after a lengthy debate, my board took the decision that we 
did take. As you have seen, the Minister took a different view over 
personal injury.”186  
This response evidences the strong ideological commitment that the 
LSB has adopted towards the market. It also draws attention to the close 
connection between the LSB and the LSCP. The attention seemingly paid 
to the LSCP’s findings affirms, in part, some of the incidents of cultural 
capture outlined in this paper. In terms of the ingredients that Carpenter 
suggests for a finding of capture, if the fact that the Legal Aid and 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is an expression of the 
public interest, then the regulatory decisions taken by the LSB shows a 
policy shift away from the public interest and towards industry (special) 
interest. The position adopted by the LSCP, their research and the 
magnitude of their desire to see referral fees not banned shows action and 
intent by a special interest in pursuit of the policy shift sufficiently 
effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable shift in the regulator’s 
(LSB) position.  
 
Lay Chairs of Approved Regulators Regulatory Boards  
 
The second decision taken by the LSB relates to the changes that they 
have made to the Internal Governance Rules for all Authorised 
Regulators. Prior to the change of these rules on the 20 February 2014 the 
Authorised Regulators were able to appoint to their regulatory boards, 
following general principles, anyone. That is to say that there was no bar 
185 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Operation of the Legal Services 
Board (2013 HC 963-1) 14.  
186 Ibid. 
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on who the chairperson might be – provided that they were qualified in 
terms of the skills, experience and qualifications. Therefore, the Chair of 
the regulatory boards might be a lawyer, it might be a non-lawyer, it 
might be a former practitioner whose days of practising were over as they 
progressed their career. Now, the Chair of the Boards can only be a 
layperson. Lawyers, and those with a background in the law need not 
apply. A suggestion that the Chairperson of Approved Regulators Boards 
must be a lay person was made in 2009 by the LSCP without any 
empirical or theoretical basis.187 The suggestion was not adopted by the 
LSB who cited it, at the time, as “a step too far.”188 As a result of what the 
LSB perceived as difficulties dealing with the SRA & BSB in September 
2013 they mooted a change of the Internal Governance Rules. The then 
Strategy Director, Crispin Passmore, presented a paper at the LSB Board 
on the 11September 2013189 where he explained the following:  
 
“The LSB has been concerned that the regulators are not 
consistently committed to the liberalisation of their regulatory 
approaches. Whilst the key regulators have taken significant steps 
forward in terms of allowing ABS, shifting their models towards 
outcomes and re-focusing on risk based supervision, progress is 
still held back by traditions of barriers to entry and cultural ties to 
each regulator’s ‘bit’ or title within the legal profession. This 
manifests in a number of ways in both policy substance and 
governance arrangements.”190  
187 Dianne Hayter, ‘Response to the LSB Consultation on ‘Internal Governance & 
Practising Fees Rules’ (LSCP, 30 October 2009)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/consultation_respo
nses/documents/2009-10-30_LSB_ConsultationInternalGovernanceRules.pdf> 
accessed 17 August 2014;  
188 Crispin Passmore, ‘Lay Chairs of Regulatory Boards’ (LSB Board Meeting 
Papers, 11 September 2013)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/board_meetings/pdf/13_59_chai
rs_of_regulatory_bodies.pdf> accessed 15 August 2014, 4.  
189 Ibid. 
190 Passmore (n 188) The Paper cites the following as reasons for the rule change: 
‘SRA reluctance to remove separate business rule; SRA approach to in-house 
solicitors ;SRA approach to multi-disciplinary partnerships; SRA pace of ABS 
authorisation and over emphasis on looking like they are controlling entry (when 
in actual fact less than 5 ABS licence have been refused).; SRA and others’ 
resistance to single appeals mechanism ;BSB reluctance to embrace non-barrister 
leading entities; BSB refusal to enforce against outcomes; Regulators’ scepticism 
about data transparency in general and failure to make the data they have in a 
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He went on to further note that:  
 
“The Executive assesses that this reticence to embrace the better 
regulation principles can put the regulatory objectives at risk. In 
particular, the continuing tendency to threaten innovation and 
undermine competition, thus limiting consumer choice and 
compromising access to justice” 191 
 
Mr Passmore also picked up on the attacks that the LSB had received 
about its approach to regulating. One of the most outspoken critics of the 
LSB’s approach has been Baroness Ruth Deech, who, as it happens, has 
for the last 5 years been Chairwoman of the Bar Standards Board:  
 
“The Board may also wish to note the level of commentary about 
the LSB’s relentless focus on consumer interests. This has been 
described as a ‘cult of consumerism’ and that an ‘excessive focus 
on the consumer interest may be to the detriment of the 
professional interests and standards upheld by the lawyers’”. 192 
 
The following quote from Mr Passmore’s paper leaves the motive 
behind the restriction on allowing lawyers to become the Chairperson of 
the Approved Regulator’s Board in little doubt.  
 
“The question is whether further changes to Board composition 
would help build greater proactivity in this area on the part of 
regulators themselves. Overly strong ties to history, culture and 
practice of self regulation by each part of the regulatory 
community are a significant drag on regulators complying with the 
better regulation principles and thus may put the regulatory 
objectives at risk. It therefore seems probable that the tendency of 
the regulators to hold on to a ‘what they know’ preference would 
be diminished by insisting on ‘a fresh pair of eyes’ at chair level, 
range of areas widely available to enable independent analysis (so called big data 
analysis) ;Regulators’ handbooks remaining complicated and prescriptive; 
Tendency to offer very detailed guidance in relation to changes which can be 
taken as mandatory; Tendency to involve complex sub-committee structures to 
scrutinise the micro- rather than macro – impact of proposed changes.’  
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
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provided that the boards as a whole have the right balance of skills 
and knowledge around the table.” 193 
 
These statements, along with others made by the LSB,194 dismissing 
the points made by members of the legal profession, does signal a rather 
narrow minded approach to discourse and decision making. Lord 
Neuberger has made the point that it is a rather peculiar state of affairs to 
dismiss points that have been constructively and intelligently made by 
educated, qualified people, who are presumably capable of understanding 
the boundaries of public life and suppressing self – interest.195 In all of 
this – there is a delicious irony that Baroness Deech has had a very 
successful career outside of the law, in public life, choosing never to 
practise as a lawyer. She would, now, on a very minor technicality be 
prevented from being Chairwoman of the BSB under the rules introduced 
by the LSB in February 2014. However, to all intents and purposes she is 
cut from the same cloth that many definitively lay chair people are cut 
from.  
What is interesting to this paper is how the policy articulated in 
Crispin Passmore’s briefing, furthering the ideas suggested by the LSCP 
was translated into a regulatory decision, which as noted, was adopted. 
The following tracks the developments. Further to a resolution by the LSB 
in October 2013 a consultation was launched on a fast track process, 
meaning that there would only be 6 weeks for consultees to respond. The 
consultation closed on the 19th November 2013. 14 of the 17 respondents 
to the consultation indicated strong or very strong opposition to the 
proposed rule change.196 Two of the three who agreed with the rule 
193 Ibid. 
194 ‘We want {legal professions} regulators to step back from dictating the 
services offered and the structures of businesses operating in the legal services 
market to allow market forces to play a greater role. This we believe will help 
create a legal services market that is the right size for consumers.’ David 
Edmonds, ‘Regulatory Standards and Assessing Regulatory Performance’ (Legal 
Compliance Bulletin, 2012) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/speeches_presentation
s/2012/legal_compliance_bulletin_article_issue_20_july_2012.pdf> accessed 22 
July 2014.  
195 Neuberger, (n 40) 
196 LSB, ‘Submissions Received to the Consultation on Lay Chairs for Front Line 
Regulators’ (LSB, 2013) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/Submis
sions_Received_To_The_Consultation_On_Lay_Chairs_For_Front_Line_Legal_
Regulators.html> accessed 14 July 2014.  
136 
                                                     
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
change were Which? and the LSCP. It is perhaps no surprise that the 
LSCP agreed, given that they were the intellectual brainchild of the ideas 
set out in the LSB’s position paper.197 No clearer evidence is forthcoming 
than the following two statements made by the LSB that they had no 
evidence for this statutory change. This paucity of evidence was picked up 
by the 14 consultees who did not agree with the LSB.  
 
“We acknowledge that this was ultimately a matter of judgement 
based on our nearly four years of experience rather than on 
quantifiable evidence. Indeed, the very nature of the issues being 
considered here makes it unlikely that quantifiable evidence would 
be available” 198 
“The proposed change was built on the LSB’s view that although 
the AARs have made significant progress by accepting the 
principle of independent regulation and structurally separating 
regulatory functions out from their representative arms, the 
regulatory bodies remain tied too closely to the individual 
branches of the profession that they oversee.”199 
 
It takes something of a leap of faith for a regulator who prides itself on 
being an “evidence based regulator” to jump from no evidence to arrive at 
the foregoing statements. It is suggested that the LSB saw an opportunity 
to speed up the pace of change in the legal services market as the terms of 
office of the Chairs of the SRA and BSB end in December 2014. This is 
aptly demonstrated in the following statements:  
 
“In consultation we highlighted our view that this proximity is 
detrimental to both the public and consumer interest. We also 
197 LSB, ‘Chairs of Regulatory Boards – Consultation on an Amendment to the 
Internal Governance Rules to Require that the Chairs of the Boards of the 
Regulatory Arms of Each Applicable Approved Regulator be a Lay Person’ (LSB, 
2013) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/pdf/lsb_consul
tation_on_lay_chairs_08_10_13.pdf> accessed 16 August 2014.  
198 LSB, ‘Chairs of Regulatory Boards, Summary of Responses, Decision 
Document on a Proposed Amendment to the Internal Governance Rules to 
Require that the Chairs of Boards of the Regulatory Arms of Each Applicable 
Approved Regulator be a Lay Person’ (LSB, 20 February 2014) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/201
40219_LSB_Lay_Chairs_Summary_Of_Responses_And_Decision.pdf> accessed 
14 July 2014, 7. 
199 Ibid 6.  
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outlined our view that overly strong ties to the history, culture and 
rules of professional self- regulation within specific sub-groups 
can act as a significant drag on the better regulation principles and 
therefore put the regulatory objectives at risk. In particular this 
negatively impacts on the objective of promoting competition in 
legal services in order to improve innovation, value, consumer 
choice and therefore access to justice.” 200 
“Further, we outlined our view that requiring the chairs of the 
regulatory boards to be lay would be likely to provide a 
proportionate route to greater regulatory independence. In 
proposing this change we acknowledge the crucial role played by 
chairs in leading their boards. In many cases, an inevitable effect 
of membership of a profession will be to influence behaviour 
when chairing a regulator. Given the importance of the chair and 
the greater time and support s/he has to shape discussion and 
consider issues, this influence could be disproportionately 
important.” 201 
 
Given the LSB holds itself out to be an evidence based regulator it is 
strange that they did not consult any evidence. It is rather questionable 
why a much broader body of literature on the subject was not considered. 
This literature draws attention to the way in which lay involvement can, 
and does skew the decision making process of a board. A portion of this 
work specifically addresses the questions of how lay involvement, 
especially where understanding of the matter at hand is important, 
contributes to ineffective decision making.202  
The timing of the LSB’s decision also raises questions about its 
attitude to regulatory decision making. At the same time that the Board 
200 Ibid 6. 
201 Ibid 6. 
202 Christine Hogg and Charlotte Williamson, ‘Whose Interests Do Lay People 
Represent? Towards an Understanding of the Role of Lay People as Members of 
Committees’ (2001) 4 Health Expectations 2; William Rothstein and Linh 
Phuong, ‘Ethical Attitudes of Nurse, Physician, and Unaffiliated Members of 
Institutional Review Boards’ (2007) 39 Journal of Nursing Scholarship 75; Guy 
Holburn and Richard Van den Bergh, ‘Consumer Capture of Regulatory 
Institutions: The Creation of Public Utility Consumer Advocates in the United 
States’ (2006) 126 Public Choice 45; Orit Dayagi-Epstein, ‘Representation of 
Consumer Interests by Consumer Associations – Salvation for the Masses? 
(2007) 3 The Competition Law Review 209; Les Carlson, ‘Use, Misuse, and 
Abuse of Content Analysis for Research on the Consumer Interest’ (2008) 42 The 
Journal of Consumer Affairs 100.  
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was pursuing these changes, a high profile story was unravelling at the 
CO-OP which revealed some serious problems of lay involvement in 
boards, and the problems that a Lay Chair can bring. It is ultimately not 
good practice to pick on individual stories as evidence of anything. 
However, given the fact that 2 high profile investigations203 were 
commissioned investigating the governance arrangements of the CO OP, 
it might have been pragmatic to reflect on these findings – which, as it 
happens, drew attention to the problems brought about by an unqualified 
and largely lay Board with a lay Chair.204 
This example demonstrates a narrowness of approach by the LSB and 
a wholesale casual connection between the policies initiated by the LSCP 
– right the way through to execution, despite vociferous opposition by 
those who responded to the consultation. It is possible to detect right 
through the decision document, published by the LSB, that actually what 
it wanted to do was to pursue its agenda without steadfast opposition to its 
plans. The document cites a rich culture and tradition of the professions as 
reasons that progress is delayed. This in a way demonstrates a counter 
cultural ideology and some of the features of cultural capture.  
 
Statutory Guidance and the Legal Education Training Review (LETR)  
 
The third decision taken by the LSB considered by this paper relates 
to its decision to use s 162 LSA 2007 to produce statutory guidance on 
how the “Approved Regulators” should make regulatory arrangements for 
education and training. The background to the LETR, in and of itself, tells 
a story. The LSB originally planned to conduct the review, however, it 
203 The Co-operative Group, ‘Report of the Independent Governance Review – 
The Co-operative Group’ (Lord Paul Myners, 7 May 2014) <http://www.co-
operative.coop/PageFiles/989348879/Report_of_the_Independent_Governance_R
eview.pdf> accessed 14 July 2014; The Co-operative Group, ‘Failings in 
Management and Governance – Report of the Independent Review Into the 
Events Leading to the Co-operative Bank’s Capital Shortfall’ (Sir Christopher 
Kelly, 30 April 2014) <http://www.thekellyreview.co.uk/documents/168461-07-
Kelly%20Review-FINAL%20REPORT-30APR14.pdf> accessed 14 July 2014. 
204 The Kelly Report is replete with criticisms about the lay Board – which he 
asserted did not fully understand the requirements of a regulated bank (page 9), 
that the Board was oblivious to a number of issues (page 9), that there was a 
failure of stewardship which was an inevitable consequence of the limited 
relevant experience of the individual Board members, that there was a serious 
problem because the CBG failed to have relevant banking experience (page 10), 
that the Board was hampered by the lack of banking experience of the Chair – 
page 11.  
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was persuaded to let the SRA, BSB and the as then ILEX professional 
standards board to take the lead under the LSB’s oversight.205 It has been 
argued that this change occurred amidst allegations that the LSB was at 
risk of going beyond its oversight role.206 The then Chairman of the LSB 
set out his support and expectations for the report in the annual Lord 
Upjohn Lecture.207 The LETR took longer than expected to produce its 
final report. During the research phase many consultations and calls for 
evidence were made.208 Throughout the research phase the LSCP made a 
formal response to the consultation.209 This response by the LSCP set out 
a powerful vision for what education and training should look like. In 
addition, the LSCP took the liberty of writing to the head of the LETR 
research team, Professor Julian Webb, urging the team to “put the interest 
of consumers at the forefront of its recommended scheme”. Moreover, the 
LSCP urged the team to take the once in a generation opportunity to 
produce a ‘bold blueprint’ for change in legal education and training.210 
They asserted that ‘vested interests’ were striving to water it down.211  
205 Legal Futures, ‘Edmonds to Back Education and Training Review as LSB 
Role is Curbed’ (Legal Futures, 18 November 2010)  
<http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/edmonds-to-back-education-and-
training-review-as-lsb-role-is-curbed/print/> accessed 14 August 2014.  
206 Ibid. 
207 David Edmonds, ‘Training the Lawyers of the Future – A Regulator’s View’ 
(LSB, 19 November 2010)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/speeches_presentation
s/2010/de_lord_upjohn_lec.pdf> accessed 16 August 2014.  
208 LETR, ‘Setting Standards, The Future of Legal Services Education and 
Training Regulation in England and Wales’ (LETR, June 2013) 
<http://letr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/LETR-Report.pdf> accessed 16 August 
2014. 
209 LSCP ‘Response to the LETR Consultation on Legal Education and Training’ 
(LSCP, 21 May 2012)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/consultation_respo
nses/documents/2012-05-21LETRsubmission.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014.  
210 Elisabeth Davies, ‘Letter from Legal Services Consumer Panel to Prof Julian 
Webb – Legal Education Review Team’ (LSCP, 23 October 2012) 
<http://letr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Legal-services-consumer-panel1.pdf>  
accessed 14 August 2014.  
211 Legal Futures, ‘Be bold and Ignore the Vested Interests LETR Told’ (Legal 
Futures, 25 October 2012) <http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/be-bold-
ignore-vested-interests-letr-told/print/> accessed 14 July 2014.  
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The LETR team published its findings on 25 June 2013212 and it is no 
understatement that the reaction to it was one that was damped with faint 
praise.213 Whilst it was a thoroughly researched document, producing a 
range of sensible recommendations, it did not, and was perhaps never 
going to, seize the once in a generation opportunity to fundamentally 
change legal education and training that the LSCP would have liked. 
Arguably the research did not suggest that this was necessary. In many 
regards the current system is not as broken as some might perceive and 
thus does not require the sorts of developments argued by some as 
necessary. Writing after the publication Neil Wightman, for and on behalf 
of the LSCP argued that a major opportunity had been missed – asserting 
that “it would have been wonderful to report that the way forward is to 
redesign legal education and training around the consumer”. He should 
perhaps be reminded that the law and its practise do not revolve solely 
around the consumer (however the consumer’s interest might be 
constructed). The rule of law, the public interest and a host of other 
imperatives are, it is suggested, equally important factors for 
consideration. The LSCP would have liked to have seen the following: 
active quality assurance by regulators, periodic re-accreditation of 
practitioners, on-going competency checks, updated professional service 
standards and skills, training and education designed and delivered around 
the consumer, a system of CPD that is fit for purpose and the creation of 
new access points to improve social mobility.214 The reason for pointing 
this out is that the LSCP were clearly disappointed with the LETR as were 
the LSB. In a briefing paper supplied to the LSB’s Board Meeting on the 
24 July 2013 it noted:  
 
“The final report starts from the position that the current system of 
education and training is fit for purpose. It therefore proposes 
incremental change, backed up by the necessary infrastructure to 
enable more significant change over time. This conclusion has 
been reached on the basis of the evidence provided to the review 
212 LETR (n 208) 
213See in particular Richard Moorhead, ‘Why Everyone is Happy and No One is 
Smiling’ (Lawyer Watch, 26 June 2013) 
<http://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2013/06/26/letr-why-everyone-is-happy-and-
no-one-is-smiling/> accessed 16 August 2014.  
214 Neil Wightman, ‘LSCP Panel Member Neil Wightman’s Reaction to the 
LETR.’ (LSCP, 25 June 2013)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/how_can_we_help/blog/blog_en
try_guest_june_2013.html> accessed 16 August 2014. 
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which focuses heavily on the views of the profession. While we 
would support the need for evidence there is a perception that the 
report and its conclusions rely too heavily on the views of the 
profession and do not give enough weight to the consumer 
perspective (as is the view of the Legal Services Consumer 
Panel).”215  
 
As statements go – the one pertaining to the fact that the evidence 
relied upon by the LETR is heavily focused on the views of the profession 
is open to question. A casual perusal of the robust academic sources relied 
upon by the LETR dispels this notion. This is before the wealth of 
submissions to the various calls for evidence and consultations are 
considered. In attempting to explain this statement – the LSB’s 
subsequent actions tell its own story. In the LSB’s Board meeting that the 
above briefing paper was received at, the Board resolved to propose draft 
statutory guidance regarding education and training. This draft statutory 
guidance was to be produced for its September Board Meeting.216 At the 
September board meeting of the LSB it resolved to put this draft statutory 
guidance out for consultation.217 The rationale for this statutory guidance 
was as follows:  
 
“In our view statutory guidance provides a clear and transparent 
way to set out the LSB’s views in this area. It also provides a solid 
basis for which they could review progress or take action if they 
found evidence of detriment to the regulatory objectives or better 
regulation principles.”218 
215 Crispin Passmore and Alex Roy, ‘LETR Briefing Paper (13)54’ (LSB, 24 July 
2014) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/board_meetings/pdf/13_54_LE
TR_report_briefing.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014.  
216 Ibid; Legal Services Board ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the Legal Services Board 
on 24 July 2013’ (LSB, 26 July 2013)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/board_meetings/pdf/20130724_
minutes.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014.  
217 Legal Services Board ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the Legal Services Board on 
11 September 2013’ (LSB, 12 September 2013)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/board_meetings/pdf/20130911_
minutes.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014.  
218 Emily Lyn, Crispin Passmore, Alex Roy, ‘Legal Services Board Meeting 
Briefing Paper (13) 58’ (LSB, 11 September 2013)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/board_meetings/pdf/13_58_letr
_consultation_paper.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014. See also LSB ‘Increasing 
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This statement, articulating the LSB’s rationale, indicates that it 
wished to set out its own vision for how matters associated with legal 
education and training should develop. What is less clear is what robust 
evidence base led them to set out this vision. There is certainly no 
reference to research in any of the briefing papers, or the consultation 
documents produced by the LSB. The framing of this statutory advice 
also, as outlined above, provides the basis upon which, in the LSB’s own 
words, momentum in this area might be maintained and a culture of 
change might be brought about.219 As clearly indicated, this statutory 
guidance is to be used by the LSB to assess the extent to which their 
vision is being pursued. The clear implication is that they intend to hold 
the Approved Regulators to account to their vision.  
The draft statutory guidance was put out for consultation in September 
2013. The period for consultation ended on the 11 December 2013. There 
were 16 responses to the consultation, 6 from the Approved Regulators, 6 
from representative bodies, 2 from legal education providers and one from 
the LSCP.220 The majority queried whether there was any need for the 
LSB to take this action. Many respondents questioned whether issuing 
statutory guidance was a proportionate response for the LSB to take. On 
the 4 March, despite many serious points being raised by the respondents 
to the consultation, the LSB published, under s162 LSA 2007 – statutory 
guidance on education and training.221 Whilst as noted earlier on the 
LSCP has a wide range of ambitions when it comes to education and 
training – it is perhaps no surprise that the statutory guidance issued by 
the LSB reflects in a multitude of ways the ideas of the LSCP. The 
flexibility in legal education and training Consultation on proposals for draft 
statutory guidance to be issued under section 162 of the Legal Services Act 2007’ 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/201
30918_consultation_paper_on_guidance_for_education_and_training_FINAL_fo
r_publication.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014. 
219 Lyn (n 218). 
220 Legal Services Board, ‘Submissions Received to the Consultation on 
Proposals for Draft Guidance on Education and Training’(LSB, December 2013) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/Submis
sions_Received_To_The_Consultation_On_Proposals_For_Draft_Guidance_On_
Education_And_Training.html> accessed 17 August 2014. 
221 LSB, ‘Guidance on Regulatory Arrangements for Education and Training 
Issued Under s 162 of the Legal Services Act 2007’ (LSB, 4 March 2014) 
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/201
40304_LSB_Education_And_Training_Guidance_2.pdf> accessed 17 August 
2014.  
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LSCP’s ideas when it comes to education and training are set out in its 
submission to the LETR research team. Without reference to any real 
substantive research the LSCP sets out, in this document, a desire to see a 
future education and training system built around an activity-based 
authorisation regime for individuals and entities.222 In particular they 
frame their entire submission around ‘activity based regulation,’ 
‘reaccreditation’ and ‘regulation of entities.’223 The LSB’s statutory 
advice, which sets out 5 outcomes, which are also qualified in some detail, 
produced by the LSB, reflects almost in its entirety these three themes, 
with some flourishes that mitigate some of the more controversial 
elements of the LSCP’s suggestions. It is, however, clear that the 
intellectual bedrock of the LSB’s vision rests quite firmly on that 
articulated by the LSCP. As acknowledged earlier in this paper this is to 
be expected as a result of the construction of the LSB and its consumer 
panel. The point at issue is, in the face of a robust piece of work 
conducted by the LETR team which laboured for 3 years to produce a 
report - where is the intellectual basis of the LSB’s statutory guidance? 
Moreover, as outlined earlier the LSB and LSCP were clearly not 
convinced by the LETR report and its apparent neglect of the Consumer. 
The actions taken by the LSB, drawing on the LSCP’s robust views in this 
area, once again suggest that the consumer it being prioritised ahead of at 
least thoughtful consideration of the public interest. Where the public 
interest lies in all of this is open for discussion, however, designing an 
education and training system around the consumer is, for a spectrum of 
reasons, unlikely to protect and promote the public interest.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
The aforementioned three illustrations of the way in which the LSB 
has made decisions reveals, firstly, an instance in which the public interest 
was, by the LSB’s own admission, not taken account of. Secondly, a 
decision that was taken by the LSB which, by its own admission, was 
based on little, to no, evidence. Thirdly, a decision was made in the 
context of education and training which was both un-evidenced and 
arguably un-necessary. What unites all three of these illustrations is the 
reliance placed on research or policy set forth by the LSCP to the LSB. In 
222 LSCP ‘Response to the LETR Consultation on Legal Education and Training’ 
(LSCP, 21 May 2012)  
<http://www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/consultation_respo
nses/documents/2012-05-21LETRsubmission.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014.  
223 Ibid 4.  
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considering the three elements of capture, discussed earlier on in this 
paper, it is difficult to conclusively arrive at an understanding of what the 
public interest is. This, as previously noted, requires further substantial 
investigation. However, in at least one of the cases, a clear alternative to 
the path preferred by the LSB was taken by the Government acting in a 
legislative capacity. They were robustly supported in this by a welter of 
other organisations and impartial commentators. As to the policy approach 
advocated by the LSB – this clearly favoured the LSCP’s preferred policy 
outcome and a discernible move was made by the LSB away from the 
public interest as maybe otherwise understood. By virtue of the LSCP’s 
expressed policy, it is clear that there was intent by them in favour of a 
special interest, purportedly representing the ‘consumer interest.’  
With regards to the second decision taken by the LSB, in light of the 
parameters of regulatory capture suggested at the beginning of this paper 
– it is slightly more difficult to make a clear determination on this. Firstly, 
understanding where the public interest lies is, as noted above a matter of 
some determination. This paper has clearly indicated that there is 
scholarship on the wisdom of lay boards in regulatory decision making. 
Doubt has been cast over whether lay boards and lay chair people are 
necessarily as ideal as some would promote them to be. The LSCP 
certainly set out their desire for lay chair persons of the regulatory boards 
a long time ago. It is unclear what their intellectual argument for this was. 
What is clear, however, is that the decision taken by the LSB on lay chairs 
favoured the LSCPs position on this matter. Given that the LSCP had a 
positive policy on this matter this demonstrates intent on their behalf to 
realise this change. Therefore, in this case, again, subject to a 
determination of the public interest, it appears that some of the conditions 
for finding capture are apparent in this situation.  
Regarding the last example, again, the public interest in this context is 
a matter for some discussion. What is, however, clear is that the LSB 
clearly favoured the LSCPs policies in this area – and clearly developed 
their thinking together on this. This is, as clearly articulated, not reflective 
of the whole broad thrust of thinking and interests in this area. The LSCP 
has a clear policy to design education and training around the consumer. 
The mere fact that they negate to consider the public interest is a cause for 
concern. In a way this suggests that they are preoccupied with their vision 
and policies – absent any real theoretical or research backing. Moreover, 
their lack of appetite to take account of the range of other interests which 
are necessary to be considered, is concerning. The fact that the LSB’s 
statutory guidance reflects in substance the policies of the LSCP 
demonstrates a move away from some important public interest 
considerations.  
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In drawing the various strands of this paper together – when it comes 
to making a claim that the LSB has been captured; a number of 
considerations need to be born in mind. The first of which is that there are 
a range of structural factors which lead to the prioritisation of the 
consumer interest. It would be incorrect to hold the LSB accountable for 
following the letter of the LSA 2007. It would also be incorrect to hold the 
LSB accountable for setting up the LSCP and working with it. If anything, 
an allegation of consumer capture rests at the legislative stage – where it 
is arguable that the Government became captured by the consumer lobby 
and entrenched voices within Government who advocated the promotion 
of the consumer interest.  
This paper has sought to explain the problems associated with the 
consumer interest and its promotion. Moreover, it has drawn on various 
critiques of commonly used economic methodologies used in decision 
making which promote a version of the consumer interest. This has, in 
part, illustrated some of the attendant dangers of promoting consumer 
orientated policies without thoughtful consideration of the public interest. 
The aforementioned economic methodologies appear not to take account 
of the public interest. The LSB appears to have struggled with 
conceptualising the public interest. In attempting to make a judgment as to 
whether the LSB has become captured by the consumer interest it is 
important to Carpenter’s definition to discover whether special interests 
have actively and knowingly sought to move policy away from the public 
interest towards the consumer interest. The foregoing has illustrated that 
there is a close connection between the LSB and the LSCP. It has also 
shown that the LSB has a strong ideological bent and that the evidence to 
back up some of its policies is both formed by the LSCP and is wanting in 
some regards. It is plausible to suggest that the LSB believes that it is 
protecting and promoting the public interest through the decisions that it 
has made. It would also be a dramatic accusation to make that the LSCP 
actively wished to knowingly and actively advance policies away from the 
public interest. For this reason, and existing problems surrounding the 
public interest in the context of legal services, it would likely be a 
challenge to conclusively meet Carpenter’s evidential burden for capture. 
If anything this paper charges both the LSCP and the LSB with failing to 
sufficiently get to grips with, and respect, the public interest. 
In terms of making an assertion based around capture, Kwak’s 
theories about cultural capture, McCarty’s theories around capture and 
provision of expertise by interest, and Zingales’ theories about economists 
capture – all provide promising routes of enquiry. As illustrated 
throughout this paper – a variety of pieces of evidence exist to suggest 
that these forms of capture might all exist. At present these remain 
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suggestions and fuller examination needs to be made of each. It remains a 
theoretical issue for future resolution how each of these forms of capture 
are to be resolved with Carpenter’s definition. The aspect of Carpenter’s 
definition that requires intent on behalf of the interest group is difficult to 
rationalise with the theories posited by Kwak in the context of cultural 
capture. By its very nature culture does not necessarily manifest intention 
or a form of mens rea. Kwak’s notion of cultural capture appears a 
particularly appealing way of explaining many of the approaches taken by 
the LSB. The way in which particular tools have been selected for 
decision making, the ideological predisposition of the member of the LSB, 
the proactive approach that the LSB have adopted, often in the face of 
expert comment advocating alternative approaches, all points to a general 
culture inside the regulator which prioritises the consumer interest. The 
pursuance of a consumer orientated set of policies is perhaps culturally no 
surprise.  
 
7. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper concludes, by suggesting that there is little prospect of the 
LSB changing its approach to the consumer interest. Sir Michael Pitt, the 
new Chairman of the LSB has re-affirmed the existing ideological 
predisposition of the LSB in a recent paper supplied to the LSB’s May 
2014 Board Meeting. He stated:  
 
“The LSB has been criticised for its ‘consumer obsession’ by 
some of the regulators and indeed the senior judiciary. I am 
similarly obsessed and for me it is a starting point. We still have a 
market which is far too intimidating, too uniform and, in many 
cases, too expensive.” 224 
 
“In the wider economy, customers are generally best served by 
well-functioning markets, with public interest safeguards and 
regulation targeted only where justified in light of the fundamental 
characteristics of the market (for example the inevitable disparities 
224 Sir Michael Pitt, ‘LSB Strategy: Chair’s Perspective Paper 14(28)’ (LSB, 22 
May 2014)  
<http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/board_meetings/pdf/20140522_
22_May_2014/14_28_LSB_Strategy_Chairs_Perspective.pdf> accessed 19 
August 2014, 2. 
147 
                                                     
CONSUMER CAPTURE AND THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007 
 
 
in knowledge between consumers and the professionals they 
consult)”225 
 
“I would like to think that every decision we make is informed by 
a “consumer interest” test of whether legal services are becoming 
more rather than less accessible. I believe there is much to be 
gained in this respect by learning from the Consumer Panel and 
the OLC who have access to significant evidence relating to 
consumer behaviours and experiences.” 226 
 
In drawing together the various elements of this paper the following 
points can be made. Firstly, there are a number of robust reasons why 
regulating in the consumer’s interest is not always a sensible thing to do. 
Secondly, there are a number of structural factors, inherent in the design 
of the LSA 2007 which led to a prioritisation of the consumer interest. 
This is compounded by modern decision making methods which 
inherently rely upon narrow decision making tools borrowed from crude 
and basic economics. For reasons to do with quantifying the public 
interest and apportioning an active intention on behalf of the consumer 
lobby to detract from the public interest – it is difficult to assert, according 
to the evidential burden set out by Carpenter that the LSB has been 
captured by the consumer interest and consumer lobby. It remains, 
however, plausible according to Kwak’s theory of cultural capture that a 
more subliminal form of capture exists. The source of this capture is 
derived from a number of sources. Irrespective of this – the danger 
remains that regulation of the legal profession and legal services will 
continue, as it appears to have done since 2007, to advance an unreflective 
consumer orientated agenda. Aspects of this agenda might service the 
public interest. However, for reasons set out earlier to do with the 
problems of promoting an individual interests, which the market does – it 
remains much more than a possibility that the public interest is neglected. 
It remains imperative that greater focus is placed on the public interest – 
such that this interest is not subordinated.  
225 Ibid 2. 
226 Ibid 3. 
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